That's what they did in the Phillipines. Japanese control of Pearl Harbor would have made it much harder for the USA to conduct its Pacific campaign.
Absurdity: A Statement or belief inconsistent with my opinion.
The carrier task force didn't have the fuel or tankers to stay around and all of Japan's available troops and assault shipping was busy taking the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya. They had to take those. Their resources were needed to continue the war in China.
If somehow they did manage to take Hawaii, that would indeed have made things a bit more difficult, but likely would not have extended the war by much. The Allies had such a greater industrial superiority that so long as they showed up and fought, the Japanese had no hope of winning.
3 words.
Capabilites
Resources
Logistics
Japan simply did not have the ability to do so in conjunction with everything else they had planned.
Remember, their goal was not to dominate the USA, but to hurt us bad enough for us to give pause while they win elsewhere such as the Dutch East Indies.
By the time we recovered, they would have been so entrenched in their new resource rich lands that taking them back would be beyond our national will to accomplish.
Their goal would be seen as a fait accompli.
They miscalculated our national will and anger at Pearl Harbor.
I joined the Navy to see the world, only to discover the world is 2/3 water!
You bring up an interesting point, CGSailor. The more I look at it, the more I wonder whether the Japanese would have been better off taking the Dutch East Indies WITHOUT attacking Pearl Harbor. I find it more and more problematic to, as you say, sell to an isolationist America the idea of fighting a major war in places like Indonesia and Indochina if no American interests were directly attacked. Attacking Pearl Harbor was a huge motivating factor for the Americans in crushing Japan.
I suppose The Philippines made the issue considerably more complicated, but if the Japanese hadn't even attacked there, I can't help wondering if America would have stepped into an SE Asian war in the early 1940s without being directly attacked. Seems like our entrance into SE Asia in the 1960s was in some sense an overreaction to the lessons learned from our solid reluctance to step into a war there a quarter century earlier.
I really am interested in seeing the counter-argument to my suppositions.
President Roosevelt wanted to enter into the war to save Britain. By late 1941, there was no longer much of a pretext of neutrality. Had the Japanese taken both the Dutch and British holdings in Asia, I think Roosevelt would have pushed for war, even if the Phillipines not been attacked.
Had the Japanese stopped at China & Vietnam, the USA might have stayed out of it. Japan wouldn't have stopped there. They needed oil badly, and the British and Dutch colonies had it.
Absurdity: A Statement or belief inconsistent with my opinion.
Good points. At the same time, FDR wanted to enter the war in EUROPE. Declaring war against Japan was not the same thing as declaring war against Germany. In fact, it was Germany who declared war on the United States, not the other way around. Hitler's declaration of war on the U.S. was considered one of his greatest mistakes.
shareAt the same time, FDR wanted to enter the war in EUROPE. Declaring war against Japan was not the same thing as declaring war against Germany.
My understanding is that the US had decided that a Japanese attack on the British and Dutch would not be enough for the US to declare war. It would be a safe assumption, though that the US would do anything short of actual war to support the Allies against Japan as they were in the Atlantic. The Japanese, though, thought that the US would consider such an attack a cassus belli and declare war. Either way, leaving a hostile power in a position to interdict lines of communication with South East Asia was considered to be an unacceptable risk.
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Though I despise Franklin Roosevelt, I don't think he had advance knowledge of Pearl Harbor and let it happen as an excuse to get American public opinion from isolationism to participants in war.
It was mere luck that the carriers didn't get taken out. No carriers, no miracle at Midway.
Hitler's biggest error was attacking Russia. Without that, he'd have taken England.
Absurdity: A Statement or belief inconsistent with my opinion.
Though I despise Franklin Roosevelt, I don't think he had advance knowledge of Pearl Harbor and let it happen as an excuse to get American public opinion from isolationism to participants in war.
It was mere luck that the carriers didn't get taken out.
In my studies of the Imperial Japanese mindset in 1941, I find a rather odd contradiction that I cannot yet reconcile. That is, the Japanese leadership held the United States in contempt, saw them as weak-willed, and felt certain that defeating them in military actions in the Pacific would result in the Americans suing for peace. Yet at the same time, they felt the greatest threat to their imperialist military adventures in SE Asia and the Western Pacific would come from the Americans, that a decisive American military move against them there was somehow inevitable, and that a pre-emptive strike against the United States at Pearl Harbor was vital if they wanted to achieve their goals. They simultaneously saw the United States as weak and lacking resolve, and dangerously strong and having the will to militarily intervene in Asia.
I see this as a result of the wildly delusional Bushido mindset that had seized the Japanese during the decades leading up to the war. But perhaps there are other reasons why these beliefs are not the contradictions that they appear to be. Any thoughts?
If the Americans are going to intervene, there's no point in waiting a couple of days and giving them even a minor advantage, even if it means you will beat them anyway. Hitting them hard right at the beginning when you have the advantage of surprise and taking the initiative is simply good drills.
shareUnderstood. But my whole question has to do with "if the Americans are going to intervene". Why were the Japanese so convinced that the Americans had no will to fight and yet were convinced they were going to intervene?
shareThey thought the US had the will to start a fight, but not the will to continue one if it started to go badly.
Yamamoto knew differently, but no one wanted to hear it. Indeed, he was told to shut up and get with the program or would be assassinated.
"Yamamoto knew differently, but no one wanted to hear it. Indeed, he was told to shut up and get with the program or (he) would be assassinated."
Exactly. And this is the crux of the issue for me. We try to analyze the logic of all these huge decisions by the Germans and the Japanese, and in the end we keep seeing clear examples of how, when actual logic is brought up in the decision-making process, it is not only over-ruled, it is aggressively resisted to the point of becoming DANGEROUS FOR THOSE OFFERING LOGIC to the discussion. Hell, perhaps Rommel ended up feeling a lot of affinity with Yamamoto...and wishing he'd at least died at the hands of the enemy the way Yamamoto did.
In other words, we keep trying to attribute rational behavior to people from Hitler to Tojo who as far as their leadership was concerned acted, in the end, highly irrationally.
What's even more ludicrous is that we then attribute irrational behavior to those Allied leaders who did act rationally, as in believing FDR would actually allow the Japanese to carry out a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor.
As much fun as the hindsight game can be, sometimes it gets too divorced from the reality of what actually happened for me.
In other words, we keep trying to attribute rational behavior to people from Hitler to Tojo who as far as their leadership was concerned acted, in the end, highly irrationally.
The true depths of their reasoning will likely never be understood.
Damnit.... warn a guy. Now I gotta clean my drink off my monitor!
I joined the Navy to see the world, only to discover the world is 2/3 water!
I find a rather odd contradiction that I cannot yet reconcile. That is, the Japanese leadership held the United States in contempt, saw them as weak-willed, and felt certain that defeating them in military actions in the Pacific would result in the Americans suing for peace. Yet at the same time, they felt the greatest threat to their imperialist military adventures in SE Asia and the Western Pacific would come from the Americans, that a decisive American military move against them there was somehow inevitable, and that a pre-emptive strike against the United States at Pearl Harbor was vital if they wanted to achieve their goals. They simultaneously saw the United States as weak and lacking resolve, and dangerously strong and having the will to militarily intervene in Asia.
"The Americans might have the resolve to intervene BEFORE the Japanese could attain their goals and cause a protracted war which Japan KNEW IT WOULD LOSE."
Sorry, but this still proves a contradiction to their belief that the Americans were weak-willed and had no stomach for war. If the Japanese believed this (and they did), then why would they turn around and fear the Americans would proactively intervene in a war thousands of miles away, much less engage in a protracted war?
Understand, I am not questioning the military wisdom of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Clearly it showed strategic military genius on their part. I am questioning how the Japanese in general could simultaneously hold the United States in contempt and consider them a primary danger to their desires.
I'll put it another way: you don't sucker punch a weaker man. You don't figure you have to. You sucker punch someone stronger than you, because you figure that's your only hope of beating them. But then, why the hell would you pick a fight with the stronger guy in the first place? I suppose my attitude about this has something to do with watching too many cocky smaller guys trying to pick fights with stronger guys, and knowing what an utter idiot the cocky smaller guy was.
But perhaps you're right. My major mistake may be in trying to interpret all this in rational terms. When a people fall in love with war and the idea of their own supremacy (through some belief system like a twisted version of the Bushido Code), perhaps there is no need for them to find a rational reason for their actions.
Understand, I am not questioning the military wisdom of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Clearly it showed strategic military genius on their part. I am questioning how the Japanese in general could simultaneously hold the United States in contempt and consider them a primary danger to their desires.
FDR would also have to be a lot more prescient than the US Navy or the combined wisdom of just about every navy in the world at that time, including the IJN.
Battleships were still believed to be the decisive weapons in naval warfare. So far, the war in Europe chad confirmed this. FDR's own experience as Navy undersecretary during the Great War would have inclined him to accept the conventional wisdom.
The fleet at Pearl comprised the bulk of the USN's combat force. In spite of being up to thirty years old, they were as modern as most of the battle fleets of the world, including Japan. The idea that Roosevelt would throw them away is ludicrous.
Had FDR known they were coming, Kido Butai would have found itself being ambushed at sea by the US battlefleet with carrier and USAAF support just as their first bombs landed on an empty, but alerted, harbour.
Hitler's biggest error was attacking Russia. Without that, he'd have taken England.
Agree with you here, Dave.
shareby joeparkson » Sun Feb 16 2014 05:06:35
Hitler's biggest error was attacking Russia. Without that, he'd have taken England.
However, the bigger point is that taking Russia was always Hitler's goal; read Mein Kampf. The entire initial European campaign was to neutralize the West from intervening in his conquest of the USSR.
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Just because it was in the Mein Kampf doesn't mean it wasn't a mistake. I'm sure that when he wrote the Mein Kampf he didn't know he'd be signing a Non-Aggression Pact.
With that signing, he now had a reliable supply of oil at his back and could concentrate on taking out England. the Germans whipped the Brits easily out of France and just by luck, failed to annihilate them at Dunkirk. The Germans had their way with the Brits in Africa. Had the Germans found a way to invade Britain, there's no reason to think that without the resource drain on the Eastern front, that they couldn't have conquered Britain. They might even have gotten help from the Irish. Once Britain was in German hands, there's no way the USA was going to invade Europe.
The aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed and clamorous to be led to safety.
Just because it was in the Mein Kampf doesn't mean it wasn't a mistake.
With that signing, he now had a reliable supply of oil at his back
and could concentrate on taking out England.
Germans whipped the Brits easily out of France and just by luck, failed to annihilate them at Dunkirk.
The Germans had their way with the Brits in Africa.
Had the Germans found a way to invade Britain
Once Britain was in German hands, there's no way the USA was going to invade Europe.
Why did Stalin sign the Pact? To buy time of course to build up his forces to fight Hitler which he knew would ultimately happen.
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Stalin's behavior after the attack was that of a man in denial, in shock, not that of a man who knew the attack would happen.
The aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed and clamorous to be led to safety.
Stalin's behavior after the attack was that of a man in denial, in shock, not that of a man who knew the attack would happen.
At the risk of repeating myself, I can't see Stalin signing the Non-Aggression Pact as anything but an opportunity to buy time to build up defensively or eventually have enough time to strike first.
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I wonder if Stalin genuinely admired Hitler as a kindred spirit? They were both cynical, ruthless dictators who liquidated people in their own government. Perhaps Stalin thought he and Hitler could share spoils. Perhaps Stalin liquidated too many people who gave him honest criticism and was left with nothing but yes men. That might explain his shock and disbelief at Hitler's invasion.
I'm pretty certain that Hitler, despite his racist views, admired the Japanese. Maybe their ideas of racial purity mirrored his own.
The aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed and clamorous to be led to safety.
I wonder if Stalin genuinely admired Hitler as a kindred spirit?
They were both cynical, ruthless dictators who liquidated people in their own government.No arguing that.
Perhaps Stalin thought he and Hitler could share spoils.
Perhaps Stalin liquidated too many people who gave him honest criticism and was left with nothing but yes men. That might explain his shock and disbelief at Hitler's invasion.
I'm pretty certain that Hitler, despite his racist views, admired the Japanese. Maybe their ideas of racial purity mirrored his own.
Ages ago I read some kind of analysis (over 20 years ago - I have no idea of where I could find it) that said that the IJN did the USN a 'favour' by sinking a lot of the battleships. Now, when you're talking human life it's hard to see it as anything but a tragedy, but in the calm light of day you possibly can look at things differently.
The analysis I read spoke of how the destruction of antiquated tonnage of shipping allowed the USN to concentrate on carriers and learn exceptional carrier tactics.
Had Pearl never happened, it would have been interesting (from a purely intellectual point of view) to see how the war would have changed.
I feel that if Imperial Japan did one more act of aggression (almost against anyone) the US would have declared war. If Imperial Japan declared war on any European nation they almost definitely would have declared war.
Then what? Does the USN, with increased surface tonnage to our 1942 Pacific fleet mean that things change for the better for the IJN. I'm not sure.
SpiltPersonality
I guess 'should have' is one question - to which the answer is 'yes'.
The other question would be 'could have' - to which the answer is 'no'.
SpiltPersonality
It would have, but it would have strained the supply train. Better to knock out the fleet to keep the Pacific Fleet at bay, then coral the annexed conquests in the Pacific, and THEN face a partially rebuilt fleet, and hope that the Americans wouldn't have the strength to face your navy.
That was the gamble.
But, as per Yamamoto's observation, Japan would have to conquer the US and dictate peace terms in the White House. That's something that no matter what edge in training and hardware the Japanese had, the could not accomplish the forces at their disposal.
I've gamed out the Japanese gambit, and have won. The failure of the Japanese to kill the carriers "sunk" their gambit. I think Yamamoto said it himself "Did we sink the carriers? No? We've lost."
Note, however, even had they sunk the three primary CVAs, there were a number of other carriers in the Pacific and Atlantic fleet, so even sinking the three big boys didn't guarantee success; it only would have allowed the odds for the Pacific theatre to even out towards the Japanese, but still be heavy in the US and UK's favor.
Hope this helps.
Why Japan Really Lost The War
http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm
The ability of the US to produce war materiel far outstripped that of any other country. Even if Japan had sunk every carrier in the US Pacific Fleet and kicked the US out of Hawaii, the US would have beaten Japan.
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True. Morison argued that Pearl Harbor was a strategic defeat for Japan, for it gave the USA the resolve to defeat Japan.
Live long and prosper.
Many were increasingly of the opinion that they'd all made a big mistake in coming down from the trees in the first place. And some said that even the trees had been a bad move, and that no one should ever have left the oceans.
I joined the Navy to see the world, only to discover the world is 2/3 water!
by joeparkson » Fri Feb 14 2014 05:07:53 Flag ▼ | Reply |
IMDb member since March 2008
That's what they did in the Phillipines. Japanese control of Pearl Harbor would have made it much harder for the USA to conduct its Pacific campaign.
Not so certain of Invasion & Occupation --- BUT
WHAT IF the Japanese had the ability or --- Gumption to send in a 3rd wave --- To specifically take out the Fuel depots and Dry Docks (Which should have been included in the 1st 2 waves)
Without the fuel and dry docks Pearl would have been useless as a major base of operations
It would have taken at least a year, maybe 2 to rebuild ---- Consider all Naval operations coming out of San Diego or San Fran in the early part of the war
You have to understand what the Japanese strategy was. They never had intent to conquer or occupy any US territory -- except the Philippines (a US protectorate at the time), because it was in their back yard. They wanted to carve out an Asian empire of their very own. Against the US, they basically thought to replay the Russo-Japanese War. In 1904, the Japanese destroyed part of the Russian Pacific fleet in the Battle of the Yellow Sea, and kept the rest bottled up in Port Arthur. So the Russians redeployed their Baltic fleet, which traveled all the way around the Cape of Good Hope to reach the Pacific. The Japanese then destroyed that at the Battle of Tsushima Strait in 1905. After this the Russians agreed to a negotiated peace, which acknowledged Japanese territorial gains in Korea, Manchuria, and part of China.
The Japanese thought they could replicate this success exactly: destroy the US Pacific fleet, and the US will redeploy ships from the Atlantic. Beat them too in another decisive battle, and maybe in one more after that if necessary, and the US will accept the fait accompli of an expanded Japanese Empire. It won't figure territory in Asia is worth losing more ships and men over.
They could not have miscalculated more disastrously if they had tried. The US was not Czarist Russia. The sneak attack on Pearl Harbor absolutely enraged Americans, who would then not be satisfied with anything less than Japan's destruction. There's actually no evidence that Yamamoto ever uttered that famous sleeping giant quote from the end of the movie, but it precisely captured what the Japanese actually managed to do with this strategy.
Thanks for the info on the Russian-Japanese War. I think Midway was the conflict that the Japanese was looking for in terms of a second encounter. That with the US Pacific Fleet destroyed that the Americans would figure it was not worth the cost of pushing Japan back to its home island. While imperfect in conduct that Japan would be the counter weight to communist aggression in Eastern Asia.
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