Charlie Wilson, and many others in Washington, were guilty of involuntary manslaughter, IMO.
The 'Negotiators' Vs. The 'Bleeders' Jefferson Morley
Reagan Administration officials can't agree among themselves about whether to acccept the latest Soviet offer to end the war in Afghanistan. While the Russians have unilaterally dropped most of their major demands, the United States has not devised a clear response. On one side, the "negotiators" in the Administration are edging toward a settlement of the eight-year-old war. On the other, the "bleeders," as they have been dubbed by Selig Harrison, want to inflict as much damage as possible on the Soviet Union...
The recent Soviet moves toward a rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan caught the Administration by surprise. "We don't know what U.S. policy is," says Harrison. "The surface indications are that the U.S. will sign on" to an agreement made at the forthcoming Geneva talks. But, Harrison cautions, "there is still a big fight going on" between the negotiators and the bleeders.
The negotiators are led by Under Secretary of State Michael Armacost, who conferred with Pakistani officials in January. Secretary of State George Shultz seems to be playing this familiar role of being dragged into an ideological fray he would rather stay above. Harrison says Armacost has the support of the National Security Council. Opposition is said to center in middle-level officials in the Defense Department and the White House. Harrison says Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle, who announced his resignation on January 16, "has been fighting a rear-guard action" against any settlement.
Another prominent opponent of any talk of settlement is Elie Krakowski, head of the office of regional defense in the Pentagon's international security affairs division. Writing last spring in The National Interest,... Krakowski contended that the Russians were preparing to annex several Afghan provinces. "The objective [of Soviet diplomacy]," Krakowski argued, "is to make the outside world believe that some 'minor' concessions on its part would resolve the problem."
The fight between the two factions in Washington focuses on the concessions that the Russians are now demanding from Pakistan and the United States. "The touchy issue is, Are we urging the resistance to get into a coalition government?" says Steve Sestanovich... "That won't sell." Others say the most crucial question is the timing of the cessation of United States aid to the rebels. The Russians, according to Francis Fukuyama...want the U.S. cutoff to occur before they withdraw, "to make sure that the situation doesn't crumble as they are leaving." Rebel supporters say they want the Russians to withdraw first.
According to two former Administration officials familiar with Afghanistan policy, Armacost agreed on his most recent trip to a halt in U.S. aid simultaneous with the beginning of a Soviet withdrawal. When Armacost returned to Washington, the bureaucratic opposition counterattacked. "As I understand it, says Fukuyama, "Shultz had to backtrack and deny that [an early aid cutoff] was what was offered."
A negotiated settlement would have to contend also with hostility on Capitol Hill, where two ment hold sway on Afghan policy: Texas Democratic Representative Charles Wilson and New Hampshire Republican Senator Gordon Humphrey. In 1984, Wilson forced through the appropriation of more than double the Administration's request for aid to the Afghan rebels--over the objections of many top Central Intelligence Agency officials. Wilson defined his goal at that time as bleeding the Soviet Union: "There were 58,000 dead in Vietnam and we owe the Russians one."
Wilson's administrative assistant, Charles Schnabel, says that his boss "views U.S. participation [in supporting the Afghan rebels] as a tremendous investment of time, money and technology. He wants to see that we support that investment, protect it." The Reagan Administration has arranged at least $1.2 billion in multilateral arms aid for various Afghan resistance groups and provided at least another $1.4 billion in Congressional C.I.A. appropriations.
The Afghan resistance is by far the biggest dollar investment of the Reagan doctrine. That fact--perhaps more than the diplomatic details--is at the heart of the Administration's indecision. To enter into a negotiated settlement of the Afghan war, regardless of its merits, would be viewed as a humiliating climb down, especially after the defeat last week of contra aid.
"We're not going to have a solution that leaves us with our last people leaving Kabul on the struts of helicopters," one Soviet official was quoted as saying last September. With all its echoes of Saigon 1975, that scenario would not displease the mid-level officials who seem to be shaping current U.S. policy. If they can force a bureaucratic stalemate, the war will drag on, a victory by default for the "bleeders."
Source: Morley, Jefferson. "The 'negotiators' vs. the 'bleeders'." The Nation 246.n7 (Feb 20, 1988): 231(1).
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