Top 10 Reasons the South Lost at Gettysburg - Gettysburg (1993) Discussion

[–] Citizenright1 12 years ago

While Picket's Charge attacked the center of the federal line, JEB Stuart was moving his cavalry around the town of Gettysburg to attack the federal center from the rear to draw troops away from the Copse of Threes and make it easier for Pickett's charge.

But, NE of town, Stuart and his "Invincibles" (who have never lost a cavalry battle) runs into Gen. George A. Custer, and his Wolverines who rout the Confederates, and the infantry on Cemetery Hills is slaughtered.

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0107007/board/thread/201429387?p=1

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[–] tom26x9 12 years ago

Kemper and Garnet drank too much of that fine Pennsylvania whiskey that thet appropriated

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[–] tom26x9 12 years ago

Harrison didnt scout the Federal position on the 3rd day because he was still smoking cee-gars in that tent Longsreet ordered be given him

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[–] iroquoisjoe 12 years ago

I would've had at #1 a philosophy that maybe contradicts half of the philosophy in your 6th item: The "south" should not have been fighting in the "north" in the first place. Just a plain bad idea.

I guess if I were to continue the theme of using quotes from the movie to illustrate the underlying concept I would use: "Well sir, I've always been under the impression that it was our strategy to conduct a defensive campaign wherever possible in order to keep the army intact." <--I realize that technically this line is referring to the location of Gettysburg specifically and not the north in as a whole but I think the general idea still applies.

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[–] ehsfb2001 12 years ago

The South was never going to win a defensive war. By taking the battle to the North the South hoped to build on popular discontent with the war as the North was losing the majority of battles. If the South had won at Gettysburg, there was a good chance Lincoln loses the 1864 election to Meade, a peace candidate.

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[–] MadTom 12 years ago

If the South had won at Gettysburg, there was a good chance Lincoln loses the 1864 election to Meade, a peace candidate.

You mean McClellan. Meade remained in command of the Army of the Potomac for the rest of the war; he'd expected to be relieved when Grant was given command of the entire Federal Army, but Grant kept him on, albeit co-locating his own headquarters with Meade's and looking over his shoulder and breathing down his neck most of the time.

Part of the reason Meade was given command of the AoP was because, while his family was from Philadelphia and he grew up there, he was actually born in Spain where his father was part of the US diplomatic mission. While he may still have been eligible to be President, there were those in Lincoln's White House who interpreted the law as making Meade ineligible and therefore no political threat to Lincoln.

But I know you meant McClellan.

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[–] tbeller80 10 years ago

Lee's offensive into the North in 1863 might have won the war, but it was a huge gamble he couldn't afford. Up until that point the South was doing pretty well beating back Union offensives. The South had chronic shortages of supplies throughout the war and on occasion needed to attack north to raid Union depots, but the biggest shortage was always manpower. Even if Lee won at Gettysburg, he probably wouldn't have had the manpower to directly attack D.C. and might have had to withdraw due to his own casualties, supplies, and Union reinforcements which would have eventually formed a new army. If he stayed in the South he might have been able to continue a defensive war long enough to get a negotiated peace. The defeat at Gettysburg was like the Japanese defeat at Midway. His best forces were gone and he would never have the strength to dictate anything else in the war.

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[–] Jitnog 10 years ago

The defeat at Gettysburg was like the Japanese defeat at Midway.

Put perfectly in words.

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[–] tallkennj 10 years ago

Not quibbling, but rather just expressing an alternate opinion: I think the Battle of Antietam was more like the Japanese defeat at Midway. Before Antietam (and Midway), it truly appeared that anything was possible for the Confederacy (and the Empire of Japan) including final victory. After that battle, both remained dangerous enemies who were very capable of winning a battle at any given moment, but, at no point, were they ever in position to realistically win the war.

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[–] indy_go_blue44 10 years ago

I'm not sure there's an equivalent to Midway in the Civil War. Had the Union lost the war you might say that Chancellorsville is (was?) the equivalent as there's no way Lee's heavily outnumbered army should have ever beat Hooker and the AoP, just as the US should have never been able to beat the Japanese at Midway.

Stalingrad/Gettysburg might be a reasonable comparison. Although the war would continue for almost 2 more years, there's almost no way (short of politics) that either the South or Germany was going to win. Also from that point the initiative passed completely into the hands of the Union/Allies; although the enemy were able to fight some important defensive battles, they were ever after in retreat (Early's raid notwithstanding.)

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[–] trob226 11 years ago

Only one reason. The Union cow-tromped them.

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[–] Salmonit 10 years ago

The Union had the high ground, thanks to General John Buford. He was acutely aware of the importance of holding the tactically important high ground south of Gettysburg and so he did.

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[–] 10 years ago

[deleted]

[–] Salmonit 10 years ago

Lee's insistance of fighting there instead of leaving Gettysburg and fighting the North on a better strategic area. He thought his troops invincible and his leadership, infalible.

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[–] indy_go_blue44 10 years ago

10. I'll quote another movie here: "Shoes, sir. The boy wanted shoes."

8. I always find myself defending Longstreet, but you're right in a sense that IF the rebel divisions had been in place at dawn (an attack Lee never ordered) or around 1pm Little Round Top would have been almost empty, but Sickle's corp also would have been in position on Cemetery Ridge and could have reinforced LRT. I'd say the greater failure was that Ewell's men weren't in position to attack and didn't support the right wing's attack. The Battle for Culp's Hill didn't get underway until nearly sunset and even then it was a near thing. Had the attack begun at 4pm (or 6pm as the attack was supposed to have been echeloned from south to north) Meade wouldn't have been able to pull Syke's (?) men away to reinforce the center and right.

Lee's right that the attacks weren't properly coordinate. His corp commanders weren't Jackson. A. P. Hill was sick with a flair up of his chronic liver condition and Ewell was used to the exacting commands of Jackson, not the discretionary commands of Lee ("tell the general to take that hill, if practicable.")

5. Ewell's corp was totally disorganized by the time they reached the outskirts of Gettysburg while a Union line had been established on Cemetery Hill by Howard, including cannon. This was the rally line, with Hancock in charge, for Union troops retreating (or routing) from the earlier fighting. Jackson probably would have tried to take the hill, but under the post-battle conditions I'm not sure he would have succeeded. (Edit. I'm referring to Cemetery Hill. As Gen. Trimble said, they (possibly) could have taken Culp's Hill and made the Union position untenable, forcing them to fall back to Pipe Creek but still forcing them to fight offensively against great odds.)

2. Agree. Lee was physically ill (green apples, good rich food?) with dysentery and possibly his angina was acting up, plus he (IMO) totally underestimated Meade and Yankee strength.

1. Agree also. Meade kept his head, trusted his corp commanders, made the right decisions, and to top it all, his men fought like demons (so did the rebels, but the Union had the high ground and more men.)

I'll also add in your list somewhere, that the Union artillery was better and fought better than the Southern artillery.

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[–] Salmonit 10 years ago

Wasn't there a limit of the amount of ammunition the southern artillery possessed?

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[–] indy_go_blue44 10 years ago

Yes, but I couldn't tell you how much had been allocated to the bombardment and how much kept in reserve, but when it was used up there wasn't much chance of getting more. Meanwhile the Union was getting resupplied from both the south and the east.

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[–] Salmonit 10 years ago

I don't think the southern artillery could've done more outside of totally exposing themselves to northern artillery fire.
That whole damn strategy was wrong and the southern artillery was just a part of a useless attack.

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[–] GreenGoblinsOckVenom86 10 years ago

I don't think the southern artillery could've done more outside of totally exposing themselves to northern artillery fire.
That whole damn strategy was wrong and the southern artillery was just a part of a useless attack.

I agree. In the movie it looks like none of the Southern Canon fire hit any of the federal troops. It seemed to mostly hit buildings more than people on the ground. I feel he should've listened to Longstreet. You want to know how foolish the South was? After the War Longstreet became known as the most hated man in the South because he blamed Lee for the loss of Gettysburg. Which is who was at fault. The Southerners were so dang stubborn that they refused to blame Lee for said failure even though it was entirely his fault. Then again he also was hated for joining up with Grant during his presidency.

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[–] Salmonit 10 years ago

In the Southern mind, if Lee did anything wrong, then the whole Southern military tactics for the war was wrong. These two hang together, now and then.

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[–] GreenGoblinsOckVenom86 10 years ago

The whole war was foolish to begin with since originally Lincoln was going to allow them to keep their slaves if they came back to the union. I guess nobody in the south believed him.

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[–] indy_go_blue44 10 years ago

In the movie it looks like none of the Southern Canon fire hit any of the federal troops. It seemed to mostly hit buildings more than people on the ground.

An interesting factoid. Neither army's artillery did significant damage to its opponent; both overshot their targets to a large degree. 1860s artillery was of little strategic use due to aiming limitations and inefficient shells (by later standards.) Ironically, Union artillery hurt the Rebels more because its overshots were landing in the bivouac areas for the coming attack while Rebel overshots were landing in the Union rear areas, including Meade's HQ.

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[–] Salmonit 10 years ago

It seems artillery was only useful when brought close to the enemy and artillery used at long distances was overrated by Generals. Of course, artillery close to the enemy was susceptable to attacks by troops and could be overrun.
Lee brought all of those cannons so many miles, using so many troops and horses to transport them, all for nought. It seems to me that artillery of the 1860s was better strategically useful in a defensive setting than an offensive one.
Maybe Lee should've chose the decisive battle in a more defensive tactic than an offensive one like Gettysburg where the south was the aggressor and the North the defender. In other words, Lee should've known this push up north was not advantageous to cannon fire for he would most likely be on the offensive in battles. Its my impression, that Lee should've known the North would end up in the defensive and he in the offensive, relegating cannon fire to something much secondary in a battle scenerio.

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[–] indy_go_blue44 9 years ago

Neither army's artillery did significant damage to its opponent; both overshot their targets to a large degree.

I meant that statement in a strategic sense. The Union artillery certainly blew the hell out of those Confederates marching across that valley.

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[–] kincaid-5 10 years ago

You have to be careful about relying on a movie, based on an almost forty-year-old novel, to analyze what is probably the most examined battle in American history.

10. General Heth’s foray into town bringing on a battle, on day 1 (General Heth, that is why we have orders… is it possible you misunderstood them?)

9. General A.P. Hill’s ordering General Heth into town on day 1.

Heth did not violate Lee's orders. He was tasked with finding out what the Federals had in Gettysburg, so he ordered a probing attack with two brigades, which is the standard way of doing that. The attack showed that there was substantial infantry, so Heth made no further attacks until directly ordered by Lee.

8. General Longstreet’s delayed attack on day 2 (“The attacks were not properly coordinated, I do not know why”)

This one has been picked over endlessly, but the "Longstreet dragged his heels" narrative is pretty well rejected now. Lee actually rode with him part of the way and expressed no disappointment with the speed of his movement. Once Longstreet's Corps arrived at their jump-off point, they had to improvise because the intelligence on which Lee's plan had been based was all wrong; Lee had thought the entire Federal army was along the Emmitsburg Road up closer to Cemetery Hill, so that Longstreet would be hitting an exposed flank, but the enemy was not where they were supposed to be.

As to the "coordination," Ewell's men were actually lucky they didn't attack as Lee intended, when Longstreet's attack opened. Most of the Twelfth Corps was pulled out from Culp's Hill to deal with Longstreet; they either got lost or arrived too late to make a difference. There was only a skeleton force on the hill when the Confederates attacked, though it was enough to stop them. If the entire Twelfth had been there, it would have been like the next morning, when the Federals had so many men they didn't have room for them all -- they were rotating them in and out of the firing line -- and the Confederates were slaughtered.

5. General Ewell’s failure to attempt to take Cemetery Hill on day 1. (“I told General Ewell, give me one REGIMENT and I will take that hill… and… he… said…. NOTHING!!!”)

This is the biggest piece of nonsense in the entire controversy. There was an Eleventh Corps division on Cemetery Hill from midday, and large numbers of retreating Federal troops -- not all of them disorganized -- had rallied there; they also had some of their best leaders. Trimble's "I could have taken it with one regiment" was delusional. Everything Ewell had available would not have been enough.

Lee's actual order, IIRC, was "Take the hill if practicable, but don't bring on a general engagement." In other words, take it only if you can do so without serious fighting. Ewell had the last useable troops in the sector, and for all anyone knew, there were three Federal corps pounding up the roads from the south.

4. General Stuart’s tardy arrival on day 2 (“It would appear General Stuart has arrived…. The prodigal son”)

This is another issue that has been picked over endlessly. Suffice it to say that Stuart had permission for his ride, but both he and Lee underestimated how fast the Federals would march north. Every time Stuart tried to reach Ewell's right, as ordered, he found Federals in the way -- and then he had trouble finding Ewell after Lee ordered the concentration in the Cashtown-Gettysburg area.

And the importance of Stuart's absence has probably been greatly exaggerated.

For 150 years people have been trying to explain the "mystery" of the Confederate defeat -- how could such a noble cause (!!!) with such a godlike leader have failed? There's no mystery. Nathan Bedford Forrest is supposed to have said that the key to winning battles is to "get there firstest with the mostest." The Federals were the first into Gettysburg and so the first onto Cemetery Hill. When the sun went down on the first day, the battle was essentially over.

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[–] jswhalen1 10 years ago

This is a well thought out post and well reasoned. Having a BS in History and studied as well as visited this battlefield many times, I have some questions and opinions as well.

1. Lee's deferring to Hill after Hill's corps swept the Union troops off Seminary Hill. Yes, Heth's and Pender's divisions were a mess. Heth and Pender were both wounded (Pender would die several days after the battle). Yet, while Heth's division was decimated due to their attacks, Pender's was still relatively strong, strong enough to attack on Cemetery Hill with Rodes Division on his right. Hill typically felt unwell on the days of battle and felt sick again on this day. Lee could have ordered Hill to have to have Lane take command of Pender's Division (which he was due to Pender being wounded) and attack.

2. Lee remaining on Seminary Ridge. Once Hill and Ewell drove the Union troops out of Gettysburg, he should have ridden down and met personally with Ewell. Not doing so gave Ewell a larger discretion to decide. Stonewall never gave Ewell that discretion. Lee should have gone seen for himself.

3. Had Hill and Ewell attacked, it wouldn't have matter. Hancock was on Cemetery Hill by then. Had he felt it was threatened, he would have informed Meade who would have only withdrawn everyone to Pipe Creek, his pre-designed defense line. This line was all but impregnable, meaning the decisive battle would have been fought somewhere else.

4. Trimble's role has always been self-serving, I believe, to help find a scapegoat for the loss besides Lee. However, Ewell still should have had Gordon and Daniel push forward to at least test the defenses on Culp's Hill. Also, he didn't recon the area east of Culp's Hill until after sundown when Johnson arrived.

5. Lee's intelligence on the Union position was correct at the time Lee planned his assault. It only changed later, when Dan Sickles, commander of the 3rd Corps, moved his troops off the lower end of Cemetery Ridge about a mile west to higher ground in the Peach Orchard and Wheatfield. His movement coincided with Longstreet's, and when Longstreet's Corps got into position, only then did they realize the change.

6. One final point on the Cemetery Hill situation on the afternoon of July 1st. You called it, "The biggest piece of nonsense." I have to wholeheartedly disagree. When Hancock arrive (around 4:00) he found what he later described as "disorganization everywhere", and spent the next hour trying to organize a defense of the hill. Had an attack happened between 4:00 and 4:30, it might have met with enough success to cause Hancock to consider abandoning the position in favor of Pipe Creek. He did not have reinforcements close at hand as Slocum's Corps was still coming up and the III Corps would not arrive until after 6:00. Ewell's decision will likely end up as the most controversial and debated decision of the battle.

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[–] star_in_the_zenith_79 9 years ago

the Union Army at the time of Gettysburg was like a wounded animal. They had egg on their face from several humiliating defeats but as a fighting force were still strong, and this made them very dangerous. Plus, they generally liked Meade and their corps commanders sort of rallied to help them out, whereas in the first two years of the war they had been straight jacketed by a great deal of tension among their generals.

Whereas the Confederate Army was very cocky at this point and believed they could do anything, and Lee bought into the ANV's feeling of invincibility. He was determined to end the war and have this be the final battle.

Psychologically for both armies it was a classic setup for a defeat of the overconfident army.

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[–] GreenGoblinsOckVenom86 9 years ago

Whereas the Confederate Army was very cocky at this point and believed they could do anything, and Lee bought into the ANV's feeling of invincibility. He was determined to end the war and have this be the final battle.

Psychologically for both armies it was a classic setup for a defeat of the overconfident army.

Yeah. Lee should've listened to Longstreet when he told him that he doesn't think anybody could take that hill and that now they had the Stone Wall like they did at Fredericksburg. And that they had lots of artillery and good fighting men commanded by Hancock who would not back off. IMO his plan on the third day was stupid and he paid the price for not listening to Longstreet.

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[–] GreenGoblinsOckVenom86 8 years ago

This one has been picked over endlessly, but the "Longstreet dragged his heels" narrative is pretty well rejected now. Lee actually rode with him part of the way and expressed no disappointment with the speed of his movement. Once Longstreet's Corps arrived at their jump-off point, they had to improvise because the intelligence on which Lee's plan had been based was all wrong; Lee had thought the entire Federal army was along the Emmitsburg Road up closer to Cemetery Hill, so that Longstreet would be hitting an exposed flank, but the enemy was not where they were supposed to be.

Yeah. The novel the Killer Angels goes into pretty good detail about this. Longstreet gets to where the battle is supposed to be and realizes the Union troops are not where Lee's intelligence said they were.
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[–] mlbroberts 9 years ago

The South didn't lose, so much as the North won.

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[–] GreenGoblinsOckVenom86 9 years ago

The South didn't lose, so much as the North won.

Yeah. Meade could've destroyed his army in detail had he pursued them but the documentary I watched (it's called Civil War battlefields and it is rather old) said he didn't want to pursue them cause he didn't want to make the same mistake Lee did.

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[–] mlbroberts 9 years ago

Take that with a grain of salt. Remember, the Union was a depleted army, too, but Meade DID pursue Lee (I recommend a book called One Continuous Fight by Eric Wittenberg and others) and several smaller battles through PA and MD resulted (Monterey Pass, Smithsburg, Funkstown, Hagerstown). Pursuit was very hard for several reasons, not the least of which was the rain. The route from Gettysburg down to Williamsport MD where Lee crossed back into Virginia looked like Texas looks right now. The retreating Confederates ground the dirt roads into mush and Meade sent many troops on other routes, but they were longer. Once at Williamsport, Lee put up a long defensive line because the Potomac was flooded. By the time Meade got enough troops there, Lee was able to cross the river. It is unclear that Meade would have won a battle at Williamsport anyway. He would have faced something like Pickett faced at Gettysburg to get at the Confederate troops. Maybe that was where the documentary was saying Meade didn't want to make the same mistake.

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[–] star_in_the_zenith_79 9 years ago

Yeah I agree. The Union Army was almost as mangled as the Confederate Army. The first, eleventh, and third corps were virtually destroyed. The fifth and second weren't much better, only the sixth and the twelfth were relatively in tact. But that still wasn't enough to finish off Lee in an offensive pursuit. Especially if the South could have dug in. Most of Meade's army was in no condition for pursuit.

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[–] jswhalen1 9 years ago

It should also be remembered that the day of Picket's charge was Meade's sixth day in command, and he had more casualties than Hooker in six months. He can be excused for exercising a bit of caution.

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[–] tallkennj 9 years ago

Just to expand on your point, not only did the Union army under Meade experience more casualties in 6 days than Hooker had in 6 months, but almost all of the casualties suffered under Hooker happened less than two months before, so, as the smoke cleared after Pickett's charge, this was a horrifically mangled army that had suffered something on the order of 40,000 casualties in less than 2 months.... and those casualties weren't just among the fighting men, officers at all levels had been killed and wounded in very large numbers. Personally, I am amazed Meade was able to pursue at all, let alone do so in a semi-credible manner. Heck, once Lee managed to get back across the Potomac, neither army was capable of campaigning again until late that fall, almost 5 months later, and, even that campaign (the Mine Run campaign) only resulted in mostly some marching and skirmishing before Meade thought the better of it all and fell back.

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[–] indy_go_blue44 9 years ago

Lincoln was pushing the pursuit mercilessly and came down hard on Meade... initially. After he got more details about the battle and the shape that the AoP was in after the battle, he backed off, then finally congratulated Meade on a well fought battle... though he still didn't think Meade was the man who knew how to do the "arithmetic" thus Grant was brought East as overall commander.

Also one point that I find expressed a lot in the Gettysburg books and the original documents is that the ANV didn't feel beat and demoralized as one would expect. There's a sense of disappointment that Meade didn't follow Pickett's Charge with an immediate counterattack.

The Williamsburg position was strong as every ANV defensive position for the rest of the war was strong, and one phrase that always comes to my mind is "you don't fight with a cornered animal" and that a wounded animal is a lot more dangerous than a healthy one. The ANV was both.

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[–] indy_go_blue44 9 years ago

Pursuit was very hard for several reasons, not the least of which was the rain.

Excellent point. Much is made of the downpour on the 4th, but it also continued to rain for the next several days, one of the reasons why Lee was essentially trapped on the north side of the Potomac by high water. But he'd so entrenched and fortified the position to the east and north that the Union army would've had to get around to the west to have any reasonable chance of a successful attack, something that simply couldn't have been done in 1863.

Although the Union army wasn't as badly depleted with casualties as the Confederates, it had taken some staggering blows and after over a week of marching and fighting the men and animals were seriously blown. I understand Lincoln's frustration, but IMO he was asking way to much of the AoP and Meade.

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[–] mlbroberts 8 years ago

Lincoln was tasting the end of the war and a Union victory - that's what he was so hard on Meade.

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[–] greenleafie 8 years ago

The Union won, because it had the superior position. Longstreet summed it up-

"There are now three Federal corps on those two rocky hills on our right flank. If I move all my people forward, well, we won't have a flank at all. They'll simply swing around and crush us. They are well entrenched up there. They aim to fight. They got good artillery, and plenty of it. Sir, any attack we make will be uphill, over open ground. How do we communicate? How do we coordinate the attack? They're all massed together, damned near in a circle. Good interior lines. Anywhere we hit them, they'll bring up reinforcements in a matter of minutes, but we try to bring up support, it has to come from miles away, and their cannon will see every move. Hell, their cannon are looking down on us, right now."

This was in reference to what would be Pickett's Charge, but it was true of the whole engagement. Longstreet saw the futility of the drawn battle lines from the start, and advocated 'redeployment' to a more advantageous location. Lee should have listened to him. It was Fredericksburg in reverse.

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[–] irishtom29 8 years ago

The Federals had better position and very good leadership. And the AoP had excellent fighting spirit. Whenever there was a crisis, especially on the crucial 2nd day, the AoP stepped up and met it.

Doesn't matter much anyway, the Army of the Tennessee and Army of the Cumberland really won the war anyway. While the East held a leg the Midwest skinned.

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