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Was a German invasion of southeastern England even possible in 1940?

posted 11 years ago by jeffyoung1
101 replies | jump to latest

This question has been endlessly debated by military historians and wargamers for decades.

Was a German invasion of southeastern England even possible in 1940?
Could the Germans have even attempted a seaborne and amphibious assault?
What would have happened had the Germans tried?

I'd like to read everyone's informed opinions.

My version that I came across many years ago was that Hitler could have indeed actually attempted a forced entry into southeastern England with four German divisions. The problem would be the Royal Navy pinching off further German reinforcements and severing German cross-channel logistical support and resupply. The end result is the German invasion force being cut off and isolated thus being forced to retreat to their original beachhead if possible or some other point of egress.

[–] Hotrodder 11 years ago

The first thing for the Germans was always to establish air superiority over at the very least Southern England and more to the point, London. Hitler was sure that being able to bomb British cities with impunity would perhaps be enough to force the British to the negotiating table. All Hitler wanted was an armistice and that Britain for now remained neutral- Britain could be dealt with later. That way the invasion of Russia could have been commenced without a war on two fronts with almost all of the resources available, barring occupation forces in the countries conquered so far. Given the appeasement by Chamberlain before this wasn't an unlikely prospect. Churchill though negated all that- I wonder what would have happened had Lord Halifax taken the job as Prime Minister?

Even before the Battle Of Britain the UK seemed to be in an untenable situation, A defeated, badly equiipped army, no real prospect of invading Europe to evict the Nazis and faced with a United States reluctant to get involved. Only the Commonwealth supported the UK, along with those men from the occupied countries who had escaped to continue the fight.
It would have seemed to have been a reasonable idea to begin talks with the enemy but Churchill realised that talks with the Nazis was futile, even then recognising that they represented a unique evil that had to be fought until the last. Lord Halifax, a man steeped in diplomacy, still thought a solution lay in that course, even in 1940. To Halifax it would have seemed the logical thing to do, preserve Britain and the Empire in the face of seemingly impossible odds.

If the RAF was defeated could an invasion force be landed? Most of the Royal Navy was in Scapa Flow and protecting convoys but it could still be sent to the English Channel without too much delay. If the Germans could grab a foothold they may have prevailed, they would need a port that could be taken and then defended, plus at least several air bases so supply by air was possible. A coup de main by Fallschirmjaeger to capture and hold the bases perhaps?

As for the landings themselves the British defences were meagre and if a sufficiently powerful force could have been landed they could have dealt with any opposition with better arms and equipment than the British possessed at the time. The British would have resisted fiercely but shortages of tanks, armoured cars and everything else would have severely hampered them- the British Army had left 80,000 vehicles in France and the Low Counries after all. In 1940 the British Army was very vulnerable.
Personally if the RAF had been neutralised I do believe an invasion was very possible even given the poor quality of the German ships and boats intended for the purpose. The trick was to gain a foothold, also perhaps heavily mining the approaches to the channel, leaving a corridor for supplying the invading army. The RN may have found it difficult to engage the enemy shipping, especially as it would be being harassed by the Luftwaffe. Yes, the Luftwaffe didn't have any bombs capable of sinking the larger ships but it would still inflict punishment.
So, yes the Battle Of Britain was vital in my view and was a victory for the Allies, and even really a victory for the USA too.

Trust me. I know what I'm doing.

[–] Jonesy_1 11 years ago

Can't fault your reasoning.

"Be safe, be happy, and don't let anyone make you afraid." David Coverdale

[–] jeffyoung1 11 years ago

Years ago I visited a game store in a large shopping mall. It was full of the traditional wargaming box modules, that is, you had to use your imagination. The usual contents of military wargaming boxes were elaborately colored and marked cardboard tiny squares. There would usually be a folded cardboard or heavy bond paper map to play upon.

One of the boxes I noted was the invasion of England, Operation SeaLion. Somone had to play the invading Germans. The point, obviously, was to see if an invasion could be pulled off.

I don't exactly remember who told me later, but some other acquaintance told me that in a hypothetical war game scenario played out - where I don't know - the outcome involved four German divisions, I think were all airborne paratroopers but can't be sure, made it into southeastern England. From there the German divisions attempted to proceed west and north west. But in the end the German divisions were in danger of being surrounded and cut off by British army and home guard formations. The German divisions were compelled to retreat back to the southeast British coast for evacuation.

[–] Hotrodder 11 years ago

Britain's main advantages was it's air force and navy. If the German army had managed to land in any numbers in 1940 with sufficient armour Britain would have went the way of France, Belgium, Holland, etc IMO. The British Army in 1940 (after the fall of France) was undermanned, badly equipped and inexperienced for the most part. Yes, they would have been defending their home turf and would fight courageously but that wounldn't have been enough IMO. The French Army -for all the myths bandied about ever since -mostly did fight bravely in 1940 but bravery isn't enough to overturn a bad situation.

Trust me. I know what I'm doing.

[–] DD-931 11 years ago

My answer is no. As is typical on these boards, the lack of understanding of the difficulties of an amphibious assault exhibit themselves most clearly in this belief that the Germans could have just run a bunch of barges across the English Channel and quickly deposited the requisite unit strength to do the job. This is nonsense. Also, it is bizarre to me the way the Royal Navy is somehow not considered a crucial element in the equation, and would not have had a devastating effect on a German invasion even IF the Germans had had air superiority. No other event would have guaranteed a maximum effort, whatever the cost, like a German invasion of England.

And if there had been no British resistance possible on the beaches? Consider the American invasion of Guadalcanal in August of 1942. The Americans met with no resistance when they came ashore, and with their superior amphibious assault capability had three days in which they brought forces onto the island unimpeded. These were U.S. Marines, far more experienced at amphibious operations than the German Army ever was. Then the Japanese Imperial Navy arrived (even under the threat of air attack, since the Japanese did not have air superiority at the time), and in the Battle of Savo Island* drove off the U.S. Navy, including all the transports and supply ships. The Americans barely clung to the island over the succeeding several months, until the tide turned.

Now imagine that happening on the British homeland, with a Royal Navy far more familiar with the waters around the invasion site than the Japanese were in the Solomons, and a larger British Army, who despite their equipment shortages had a far shorter supply line than the Japanese had at Guadalcanal.

Sorry, but I don't think the Germans had a chance pulling off a successful Operation Sea Lion. And I think the German military leaders were smart enough to see that, which is why they called it off.

*Yes, I am well aware that the Battle of Savo Island was a night action. I am also aware of how good the Japanese Imperial Navy was. But I believe the Royal Navy were also capable of a night action, particularly in familiar waters, and didn't have to deal with a threat from the German Navy even close to what the U.S. Navy was capable of.

[–] Vulcans_Rule 11 years ago

The German Navy had just embarassed itself at Narvik. In the Summer of 1940, the Kriegsmarine was plagued by lousy destroyers, a lack of battleships, and torpedoes that did not work. It was by far the weakest branch of the Wehrmacht and not up to combat with the Royal Navy, whose weapons were less than stellar but at least they worked. The Luftwaffe was impressive, but aircraft were not as good against ships as the air optimists believed at the time. Any invasion attempt would have been very vulnerable to effective intervention by the RN, especially by night.

Had the Germans seized Dunkirk and prevented the escape of the BEF, then a relatively weak and fumbled invasion might have sufficed.

Live long and prosper.

[–] Squeeth2 11 years ago

I must say that everything I've read since the last time that this question was discussed (2006) makes the possibility of an invasion out of the question, never mind an invasion succeeding.

Marlon, Claudia and Dimby the cats 1989-2005, 2007 and 2010.

[–] Hotrodder 11 years ago

As I said what about heavily mining the channel each side of an invasion route? Yes, the RN had minesweepers but could that give the Germans sufficient time to land a force in some numbers?
The English coast wasn't exactly the Atlantic Wall in 1940 most defences consisting of a few mines- which the British were short of, barbed wire and often obsolete machine guns in hastily prepared positions. The Home Guard was mostly equipped with a few shotguns, pikes and bugger all else in 1940.
Yes, the British Army was larger than any initial invasding force but that was the case in Normandy 1944 too until sufficient numbers were landed by the Allies. I still think they would be out fought by the German Army- they were simply better equipped, better trained and tactically better. I'm not trying to diminish the courage of the British soldiers of the time (or the /LDVHome Guard) but they would have struggled to stem a reasonably large invasion force.
The RN has to break through to disrupt any German supply line and the Luftwaffe, if it had air superiority, would be relaying mines as fast as it could too.
Yes, the barges weren't ideal by any means for an amphibiious assault but if the weather stayed fine- which it did in the Summer of 1940 they only had to get a sufficiently large enough German Army across the Channel. Aided by transport aircraft landing on air bases captured by German paratroops I think it was stil a possible operation. Yes, the Ge3rmans would need a lot of luck but sometimes luck even favours the bad guys.

Trust me. I know what I'm doing.

[–] DD-931 11 years ago

Imagine British battleships sitting ten miles off the invasion route, at night if necessary, lobbing 14 and 16 inch shells in among the German barges. And onto German positions once they'd landed. And onto the German resupply terminal at Calais. The Americans had air superiority at Guadalcanal, but the Japanese Navy still made their lives hell at night.

Imagine if the Allies landing in Normandy in 1944 had had to use barges. No way you keep the flow of supplies coming ashore with barges the way they did at Normandy. And by the way, the Allies had a lot more landing craft in 1944 than the Germans had barges in 1940, and still came dangerously close to running into a critical shortage of them.

And the Luftwaffe was nowhere near as good at sinking shipping as some people think. They never matched up to the Americans, the Japanese, or even the British in that regard.

Sure, the Germans could have landed a good number of troops on the English shore. Again, like at Guadalcanal the initial landings might well have been unopposed. But the Germans most likely would never have seen those troops again.

[–] Squeeth2 11 years ago

Consider what the navy did to the sea invasion of Crete in 1941.

Marlon, Claudia and Dimby the cats 1989-2005, 2007 and 2010.

[–] joske 10 years ago

Talking about bravery... The Dutch fought like lions, but flattening Rotterdam made us surrender within five days, the Germans threatening to flatten other major cities.
The same scenario could would have been possible on the British isles..

[–] R011DaveAAA 11 years ago

Why Sea Lion wouldn't work:

1 ) Naval

The German Navy had suffered serious losses in the Norway Campaign and was virtually eliminated as an effective force during the rest of 1940.
Germany had no amphibious shipping or doctrine.
Rhine river barges that they were to use as landing craft had such low free boards that they'd have been unsafe for Channel crossing even in calm weather. Many of them were unpowered, which made the issue of how they were to be beached problematic. The powered ones had a top speed barely higher than the speed of Chanel currents.
The Germans tried to seal the Channel with mines. It didn’t work in part because the British kept sweeping them.
Eve if sealed of, there were still considerable RN forces already in the Channel.
The Channel was not a good place to use submarines. The waters are too confined, especially with all the British and German minefields about.
The German Air Force at that time had very limited anti-shipping capability and no night attack capability.

So what would happen is river barges escorted by a few light craft would be slaughtered by RN destroyers and old cruisers. They'd hardly need to use their guns and torpedoes as the wake of a high speed warship would be enough to swamp them. The few Germans who did land would be cut off from resupply and defeated in short order.

2 ) Land

The plan was to land forces without division and corps artillery. Contrary to popular belief, British forces were not entirely disarmed. Several reasonably well equipped divisions were available to counter attack German landings.

3 ) Air

Combat elements of the German Air Force would have three tasks:
One was to provide air support to the landed troops. This not only clu8des interdiction and the normal close air support, but they were expected to substitute for division and corps level artillery.
Two was to prevent the RN from interfering. As noted above, they had little or no training or equipment suitable for this task. Yes, they did it British warships at Dunkirk. They were stationary targets at the timer, not manoeuvring at twenty or thirty knots. I was another year before they had trained anti-ship groups available in the Med.
Three was to prevent the RAF from interfering either with ground fores or such naval elements as the RN hadn't sunk.

There big issue is that that was two tasks too many. While the Germans had to do all three every day, the RAF could pick its daily tasks – covering an coordinated RN attack, hitting the invasion fleet, or attacking the Army.

4) Air Assault.
The short version - the campaign in France and the low countries had attritted German transport strength so that it would be unable to transport and support Germany's single airborne division.

5 ) Well, what if they just went right after Dunkirk?

They still had three weeks worth of defeating France to do first. Following that, German formations would need to regroup, replace casualties, train, and otherwise prepare for any further operations. They wouldn't be ready until the end of summer anyway.

[–] R011DaveAAA 11 years ago

Do read this:

http://www.philm.demon.co.uk/Miscellaneous/Sealion.htm

[–] DD-931 11 years ago

Excellent information, Dave. Sea Lion appears to have been even less feasible than I thought it was.

[–] Hotrodder 11 years ago

I dunno though. Churchill thought an invasion was a strong possibility. His "fight them on the beaches..." speech wasn't just bull and bluster, he really thought an invasion was all too possible and that Britain may have to fight to the last and that going down fighting was the only way to go. We do tend to forget how people felt at the time. How much of our present assessment is purely in hindsight?
It would be interesting to see a British military assessment from 1940 itself on the feasibilty of such an operation, and how the resistance to it would fare.
It's not sure that Britain was that well prepared to resist an invasion in 1940, after all the Battle of France and it's subsequent fall certainly hadn't been expected. We know that thanks to Dowding and others that at least the RAF was as fully prepared as it could be even though it had less numbers than Dowding would have liked, largely again due to events in France. For once -in the air at least -someone did prepare to fight the next war not the last one.

Trust me. I know what I'm doing.

[–] DD-931 11 years ago

Clearly the Germans seriously considered an invasion of England. I think it would have been utterly irresponsible for Churchill to simply dismiss it (although his speech was a rallying cry that came at a crucial point after Dunkirk when the British people needed to re-dedicate themselves to a long war ahead, and a possible invasion was a great focus for that rallying cry).

No one says that the Battle of Britain was not a crucial victory for the British. I myself think it was a battle that seriously swung American sympathy and support to the British, and began the process of overcoming isolationism and accepting the necessary American role in defeating the Nazis. But the reality is, a German invasion of England didn't stand much of a chance of success, and it's silly not to point that out.

[–] Hotrodder 11 years ago

I don't think Churchill just meant it as a rallying cry though, I think he seriously believed an invasion could very well happen and it was his way of sticking two fingers up to the Nazis- and not the "V" sign of victory either. If we're gonna go, he was saying, let the buggers pay for it.
As for the Germans if the Battle Of Britain has resulted in a victory for them, who knows? They would have been brimming with condidence by then, convinced that nothing would stop them. So far they had beaten all the odds so far. After all many thought France would never be defeated, certainly not so quickly. Hitler I'm certain would have tried an invasion and yes, probably it would have been a failure. But just say that old decider- luck- was with them and somehow they succeeded in getting a decent foothold? Time and time again the Germans did the unexpected and succeeded.
Many a battle or campaign has resulted in a victory for the one expected to fail.

Trust me. I know what I'm doing.

[–] DD-931 11 years ago

"Time and time again the Germans did the unexpected and succeeded."

Like the Battle of Britain?

Again, this is not a slight on the major accomplishment that was British victory in the Battle of Britain. But I do find it aggravating when the major difficulties involved in a large-scare amphibious assault are dismissed so easily. The Americans AND the British worked long and hard to perfect it, and the Germans were just never good at it. In case you haven't already picked up on it, I think the work of the RN and the USN in the Atlantic is unjustly ignored, and I think something the RN has never gotten credit for is the fact that they were such a potent force and clearly so much better than the Kriegsmarine that the Germans ended up accepting that they would never be able to take them on in an invasion of Great Britain. Goering may have thought his Luftwaffe could destroy them, but I think we all know just how good of a military genius he was. Meyer, anyone?

[–] Hotrodder 11 years ago

Oh, I know the German attempts at assembling an effective amphibious invasion force were amateurish at best- I mean barges? More pointing out the lack of readiness of the British Army the resist an invasion. Overlord really took four years to plan but equally well the German had four years to prepare to engage it. The British in 1940 had a couple of months. Yes, they still had some equipment left but a German force in some numbers on British soil is still a sobering thought.
Likewise the Japanese prepared their defences well for any invading force and they did inflict high losses on the US forces in the Pacific.
As for the RN it ain't called the senior service for nuthin' and yes, I agree, it performed well in WW2. The RAF did too. But the British Army was found wanting quite a few times and this is part due to it being far more populated by conscripts than the other two, being a member of the PBI just needs very basic training but the RN and RAF needed better trained men and thus were more effective.
Having said that the Fleet Air Arm should have had better aircraft but wa stifled by a policy of having aircraft with at least two men aboard and obsolete aircraft too- the Swordfish springs to mind. Don't get me wrong here the Swordfish atacks on the Bismarck and the Italian Fleet at Taranto are classic operations but the British shouldn't have been so behind in carrier aircraft technology considering they had the first carriers.

Trust me. I know what I'm doing.

[–] DD-931 11 years ago

"pointing out the lack of readiness of the British Army to (sp) resist an invasion."

Understood. All I can say is, the British should (and as I understand it often do) wake up every morning and thank God for the English Channel.

[–] DBloodnok 11 years ago

It's a great topic for discussion.

I think if - IF - the Germans could have thrown across a hodge-podge of forces in the days immediately after Dunkirk and gained some ground then the pressure on the Government to reach an accommodation with Hitler might have forced negotiation. The Germans didn't necessarily have to win militarily in this kind of invasion - it would purely be an attack on morale, which was (understandably) shaky around Dunkirk. The British Army in those days right after Dunkirk was in an absolute state: my grandfather who was evacuated from Dunkirk told me that the troops were so utterly fed up that they simply went home.

However, the Germans never really had any plan to launch any kind of reflex operation against Britain in those few days, especially considering the naval losses suffered during the Norway campaign.

Any subsequent invasion of the UK would have received a drubbing, in my opinion. The Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst did a wargame of Sealion of 1940, it's well worth reading about: Germans knocked out, second round.

"Someone has been tampering with Hank's memories."

[–] Squeeth2 11 years ago

A few years ago I thought that the Germans could have bounced the Channel and suggested Crete as an example but since then the failings of the German war machine and more knowledge of the remaining military potential of the army in Britain have led me to change my mind.

Consider that most of the tanks lost in France were reconnaissance tanks and that as many tanks were built between 1939 and Dunkirk as were lost in France and that most of the new ones were I and cruiser tanks, of much greater effectiveness (although the army had to wait until 1941 for the Valentine, the best tank of the war).

Marlon, Claudia and Dimby the cats 1989-2005, 2007 and 2010.

[–] R011DaveAAA 11 years ago

I think if - IF - the Germans could have thrown across a hodge-podge of forces in the days immediately after Dunkirk

They couldn't do it, even if they didn't still have another month of fighting in France ahead of them.

They had no navy to speak of and no available airborne forces after the Netherlands. Even a raid was out of the question.

[–] Lyndhen 11 years ago

IF - the Germans could have thrown across a hodge-podge of forces in the days immediately after Dunkirk and gained some ground then the pressure on the Government to reach an accommodation with Hitler might have forced negotiation.

There's a book by Macksey (a British army officer), which more or less makes the same point. Had the Germans been able to get across the channel in July they wouldn't have faced significant military opposition on land. Your grandfather's personal experience seems to fit in very much with the book's research.

Though I should add that to examine his hypothesis, Macksey doesn't take into account the Royal Navy, unfinished business in the Battle of France, lack of German preparation/capability (for crossing the channel) etc.

[–] DBloodnok 11 years ago

I would agree with you chaps: I don't think the Germans remotely had the capacity to make any sort of assault even immediately after Dunkirk (that's why the caps were on IF !). However, IF they hadn't had such great naval losses (relatively) during Norway and IF they hadn't launched the airborne ops in The Netherlands, then they might have had just enough lift to get across with something, maybe just enough to make a difference.

But, with how the balance of forces ACTUALLY stood in 1940, I think Sealion as conceived would have been a bloody mess for the invaders and the first great Allied victory of the war.

"Someone has been tampering with Hank's memories."

[–] R011DaveAAA 11 years ago

No. Even wihtout Norway losses, they had not a hope in hell of matching, let alone beating, the Royal Navy in the English Channel. As for airborne troops, the single division they had would be stuck in England without artillery and without air superiority, no realistic hope of resupply or effective air support. Bagging a division of Herman Goering's favourites would have been a majpor proaganda coup for the British.

[–] 11 years ago

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[–] R011DaveAAA 11 years ago

Odd then that he ordered preparations made, which included commandeering river and canal barges that were important to the German economy, and had plans developed without mentioning, either in public or private, that it was all a bluff.

[–] 11 years ago

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[–] Lyndhen 11 years ago

The RAF had been bombing Germany for over a year before the London Blitz started.

with leaflets.

Incidentally, who started WW2?

[–] 11 years ago

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[–] R011DaveAAA 11 years ago

Actually, the Soviet Union didn't invade until seventeen days after the unprovoked invasion of Poland by Germany. As for Britain, their pre-war agreement with Poland specified they'd declare war if Germany invaded pointedly ignoring the Soviets. The Soviets claimed to be securing the people living there from the coinsequences of a Polish state which they said had collapsed. As it happened, quite a few people beleived the Soviet claim to be reasonable given that the region seized was part of Belarus and Ukraine before the Poles took it in 1920. The secret protocals to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact were not known until German records became available to teh West in 1945.

[–] 11 years ago

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[–] R011DaveAAA 11 years ago

The Soviet Union had agreed on 23rd August 1939 to invade Poland after Germany.

Something not revealed until after the war.

The collusion was completely obvious at the time.

There was a substantial body of opinion in Britain and especially France who belioeved Stalin when he said the Soviet invasion of Poland was justified. There was also a rather larger body of opinion, including in Cabinet, that a war with Germany was bad ebnough, one witrh the Soviet Union too was madness.

By forming an idiotic pact with Poland

So you would have preferred that Nazi aggression should go unpunished and assumed that Hitler would not turn West to avenge the defeat in the First World War as he had already pledged to do and the German Armed Forces were planning. Indeed, the Germans believed they would be at war with the UK by 1945 and the Navy, at elast, was nonplussewd by having to go early.

[–] 11 years ago

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[–] R011DaveAAA 11 years ago

The collusion between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939

Was apparent only to those who wanted to see it. Not that it matters.

Churchill must have been an American plant sent to destroy the UK as a world power.

Churchill had no Cabinet office, let alone the Prime Ministership until after the declaration of war.

As for the Empire, the British were not going to be able to hold India another deacde regardless of war and British industry was already obsolescent and outstripped by the US.

Hitler never wanted war with the British Commonwealth and Empire at all.

Then he was a fool not to heed the British ultimatum wasn't he? Not that it stopped him from preparing for one.

[–] 11 years ago

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[–] R011DaveAAA 11 years ago

The UK would easily have been able to retain the Empire

There were a few hundred million Indians who disagreed with that.

Germany, which was no threat to us at all.

[sarcasm]Because crazy militarists, who had already proven themselves to be untrustable, controlling the European continent would never be a trouble at all.[/sarcasm]

[–] 11 years ago

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[–] R011DaveAAA 11 years ago

The Indians had never succeeded in rebelling, and never would have without World War II.

"The Indians" never tried. Some individual local rulers did and were put down mostly by other Indians. That was no longer a realistic option by 1939 as India had become politically united against the British occupation, something that wasn't true before. Not that rebellion was the way INdians had chosen to gain their independence. They had chosen the measn of peaceful demonstrations, non-cooperation, and the ballot-box. Nor were the British people willing to impose their will on India by force.

Stalin was far worse than Hitler,

Surprisingly - no, which just goes to show what a monstrous regime Hitler ran. In Poland, for instance, about a million Poles more or less died in a half century of Communist rule. Some six million Poles, about a fifth of the country, died in five years of Nazi occupation. The Germans closed universities and seminaries, the Communists opened them and built new ones. Karol Wojtyla, who became Pope John Paul II, could not be ordained as a priest until the Red Army kicked the Nazis out. The Germans murdered teachers and engineers, the Communists trained them. The Germans fired Poles from any supervisory positions while Communists had Poles running the country. (even if under supervision at the very top). The Germans tried to destroy Polish industry, the Communists built it - and so on. Mind you, a free Poland would have done even better, but that wasn't in the cards. Incidentally, the final German plan for Poland and the Poles and for the other Slavs was to eliminate Poles as an ethnicity and to turn Slavs into quasi-medieval peasants literally owned by German landowners

and World War II was the worst defeat the UK ever had.

Both Hitler and Stalin and their regimes are dead. The British regime continues. The empire that was becoming an anchor to Britain is long gone and good riddance. Just to maintain the pre-war forces whose main purpose was to secure that empire would require nearly a doubling of current defence expenditures (There are 186 thousand members of the British armed forces today compared to 321 thousand in 1935, Note that Britain already spends slightly more as a percentage of GDP on defence than in 1935).

http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/sep/01/military-service- personnel-total

[–] Lyndhen 11 years ago

@ Dave

Interestingly, Poles are adamant that Stalin was worse.

Between 1939 and 41, the Nazis and Stalin were more or less identical in the activities. Both killed off the educated classes - Intelligenzaktion, Katyn etc. Both deported undesirables on mass - to the general government and to Siberia respectively. Both aimed to destroy Polishness - turning the remaining Poles into an underclass of manual labourers in Germany and in the USSR, to be subsumed into soviet citizenry.

The Poles argue that Stalin was worse because he was supposed to be an ally after 1941. As an ally, Poles got their country back and the church was not eliminated but Stalin did a very good job of continuing from where he left in 41. Shooting and deporting en mass the remaining educated classes and AK.

About industry - isn't it rather the case that the Nazis just stole it from the Poles. With regards to the USSR, some industry was developed in Poland (ie Silesia, and south Poland), but when compared to Bulgaria (heavily industrialised by the communists) the soviets didn't appear to be so interested in developing Poland. An anecdote along similar lines is that the Warsaw Poles were apparently offered a useful metro line or a useless 250 metre tall Stalin palace to stand in the middle of the city. The Poles chose the metro line - they got the palace.

I'm rather of the opinion that Hitler was worse because Poles and Poland would not now exist. But conversely, if Poland had allied with Hitler in 1939, would he have treated the Poles as badly as Stalin did?

[–] 11 years ago

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[–] Hotrodder 11 years ago

I've been reading your posts on here, EdwardCarter and frankly you're a moron. And a Neo-Nazi moron I'll wager too due to your support of Nazi Germany.

Trust me. I know what I'm doing.

[–] R011DaveAAA 11 years ago

It was all a bluff to put pressure on the British government to come to terms, as Adolf Galland, Karl Donitz, Gerd von Rundstedt and many others admitted.

As you read on Wikipedia. When did Hitler imform them that SEELOEWE was a bluff?

The RAF had been bombing Germany for over a year before the London Blitz started.

In fact, German air raids against Britain began in October 1939 while the first British ship sunk by German submarines, an unarmed passenger liner, was attacked the same day war began. Fifty-two merchant ships were sunk by the German Navy in September 1939.

[–] 11 years ago

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[–] R011DaveAAA 11 years ago

When did Hitler inform them that SEELOEWE was a bluff?

The first British ship sunk by German submarines, an unarmed passenger liner, was attacked the same day war began. Fifty-two merchant ships were sunk by the German Navy in September 1939.

[–] 11 years ago

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[–] R011DaveAAA 11 years ago

When did Hitler inform them that SEELOEWE was a bluff?

Um, is that maybe because the UK and France had declared war on Germany and started to bomb German harbours?

No. The submarine commander would have had no idea that there had been a small air raid no more than a couple of hours earlier. He and others were already in place before the British issued an ultimatum.

the RAF had already been bombing Germany for over a year.

Bombing mostly military installations and dropping leaflets until Nazi bombs started dropping on civilians in France, actually, and doing little damage afterward. Meanwhile, the Nazis had been bombing civilians indiscriminately as well as murdering them in more old-fashioned ways since 1 September 1939.

[–] DD-931 11 years ago

Actually, in practical terms the Japanese were as responsible for "dismantling" the British Empire as the Nazis, driving the British (and other European powers) completely out of east Asia and pushing all the way into India. This all happened independently of Nazi Germany's efforts, and since there is a logical argument to be made that World War Ii actually began when Japan invaded China in 1937 (if not when they invaded Manchuria in 1931), this is another reason to believe that the British Empire was under threat of collapse whatever Nazi Germany did. Remember, even after Pearl Harbor the British believed that their "Gibraltar of the East", Singapore, would withstand any Japanese attack, with the help of their prime capital ships THE PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE. In a matter of two months both were gone. There's a reason why the Fall of Singapore is often considered Britain's greatest military defeat of World War II.

There's also a reason why Hitler was interested in joining forces with Japan as early as 1936. Their first treaty, the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1937, may have been anti-communist in origin, but after Britain and the League of Nations condemned the Japanese invasion of China that year, Japan's increasing anger at the European colonialists in Asia was certainly welcomed by Hitler.

Just trying to bring a little perspective to this eurocentric conversation.

[–] 11 years ago

[deleted]

[–] R011DaveAAA 11 years ago

I agree that one cannot ignore the Japanese in this and that Japanese policy was mostly unrelated to German interests after the Great War.

Japanese aggression was a separate concern to Britain and America from German aggression, but the dynamics of how that concern was expressed and whether it would have led to war if there was no war in Europe would be quite different.

For one thing, France would not have declared war on Germany without Britain. This means no defeat in 1940 and almost certainly, no Japanese invasion of Indochina. It was that invasion that led to Anglo-American sanctions and thus to war.

Without war in Europe, British deployments would have been different as well. There might have been more and better British Empire forces there without the best of them being sent to Egypt or kept at home. Then again, without the mobilization demanded by a European war, the Empire might not have the forces available, and certainly could not ignore the potential German threat.

[–] DD-931 11 years ago

Yes, there would have been war on the European colonial powers in Asia and the United States by the Japanese regardless of any war in Europe. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere designs of the Japanese guaranteed that. The expulsion of the European powers from Asia in the 20th century was an inevitability, and an Imperial Japan was not the only Asian nation desiring it, simply the one most capable of achieving it. The timing might have been a little different, but it would have happened. For instance, the Anglo-American sanctions mainly stemmed from the Japanese invasion of China in 1937, well before the invasion of Poland, much less France. Also, the underestimation of Japanese military prowess in Asia by every nation in Europe AND the United States was a given regardless of any war in Europe, and was simply destined to have devastating consequences.

Seriously, Hitler had NO call on when and what the Japanese would do. If he had, he would have done the Japanese a favor by declaring war on the United States sooner, drawing more American forces out of the Pacific before Pearl Harbor. He also would have had the Japanese declare war on the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, opening a second front for the Soviet Union at a time when it would have been least able to deal with it.

[–] R011DaveAAA 11 years ago

The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere designs of the Japanese guaranteed that.

You've claimed this before. It was nonsense then and remains so. The Co-Prosperity line was simply a propaganda cover for their aggressions. The expansion of the war in China into Indochina was an opportunistic land grab intended to cut supply lines to the Chinese. The later invasions of the Philippines, NEI and Malaya were reactions to the Allied and American embargo against Japan.

With no active war in Europe, France can deploy significant ground forces to a threatened Indochina while the UK can deploy enough of the RN and RAF to match the IJN and JAAF. These are not the easy pickings the Japanese faced in real life. Given that it was the invasion of Indochina that caused the embargo, the Japanese would have no reason to strike at that time and could continue the war in China without worry that oil, ribber, and other resources needed to continue that war would be cut off.

[–] DD-931 11 years ago

"A propaganda cover for their aggressions." Of course it was. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was always going to be the name that the Japanese Empire would run under. Makes no difference to what I'm saying. The aggression is the same. The Japanese still wanted to control all of East Asia, which is the entire point of my statement. The Philippines, NEI and Malaya were future targets of Japan before any embargo. The Japanese always knew that the only way they could guarantee control the flow of oil from Indonesia etc. would be by having it under their military control. And by the way, embargoes against Japan by the United States began in 1938 over the Japanese invasion of China, and it was the fact that supplies for the Chinese resistance were coming from Indochina that resulted in the Japanese invading Indochina. The slide towards war their was, again, inevitable. The Japanese would have had no problem with a French fleet arriving off Indochina to do battle with them. Considering what they did to the RN and USN fleets that they met all the way into mid-1942, the French fleet would have met with a disaster. Remember, even in the Battle of Java Sea in February of 1942 the Japanese easily defeated a combined Allied fleet that included Dutch warships and was commanded by a Dutch admiral (even though the Netherlands had already been conquered by Nazi Germany years before).

The British already believed they had deployed enough of the RN and RAF to match the IJN and JAAF in December of 1941. Why do you think the PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE were there? Churchill has already stated that the sinking of those two ships and the fall of Singapore were two of the biggest shocks of the war for him. And then there is the Indian Ocean Raid of April 1942. As I already said, the British (AND the Americans) severely underestimated the Japanese military, which they were going to do regardless of the war in Europe. They were simply destined to pay for it.

[–] R011DaveAAA 11 years ago

The Japanese still wanted to control all of East Asia

Which part of opportunistic are you having trouble with?

The Japanese would have had no problem with a French fleet arriving off Indochina to do battle with them

The French fleet would have stayed in the med watching the Italians. Without Germany to deal with, they'd have most of the RN to deploy in Asia. Do note that unlike real life 1941, they could deploy a dozen capital ships and most of their carriers. The Japanese would also need to deal with a large number of French and British land and air reinforcements in front-line squadrons with the best pilots and aircraft.

The British already believed they had deployed enough of the RN and RAF to match the IJN and JAAF in December of 1941.

They thought they had deployed enough from what they could spare to deter the Japanese. With some eighteen capital ships by late 1941 compared to eleven in the IJN, the French in the Med, and no need to keep more than a token force to watch Germany, they could easily send a very strong squadron to meet the Japanese fleet and send a lot more reinforcements.

As for the IJN being able to beat equal numbers of Anglo-American ships, that's something they wouldn’t know until they tried it and do note that they usually ended up with local numerical superiority in the early days.

[–] R011DaveAAA 11 years ago

And by the way, embargoes against Japan by the United States began in 1938 over the Japanese invasion of China,

In fact, while the 1911 trade treaty was revoked in 1939, the US did not embargo Japan until October 1940 with a complete embargo of oil and other strategic goods not happening until July 1941.

Note too that Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk by IJN twin engine bombers based in Indochina, bases they would not have had then without their 1940 invasion.

[–] Squeeth2 11 years ago

The defeats in the Far East left Britain far more dependent on the USA than the fiasco in France 1940. Europe was a geopolitical defeat and the Japanese War was an economic disaster - all the oil from Burma, tin and rubber from Malaya down the toilet.

Marlon, Claudia and Dimby the cats 1989-2005, 2007 and 2010.

[–] 11 years ago

[deleted]

[–] DD-931 11 years ago

What part of IMPERIAL Japan are you having trouble with? If you can't grasp that the Japanese were bent on creating an empire of their own in East Asia, regardless of what happened in Europe, sorry to hear that. But they were.

Certainly it was helpful to the Japanese that the British were engaged in a war in Europe and the French were defeated there. But Germany hadn't drawn the United States into the war in Europe (and didn't want to), and the Japanese still took them on full bore. The Japanese knew that the greatest threat to their imperial aspirations was always the United States, not the European powers. And naturally any military tries to ensure numerical superiority in battle, but the Japanese did not have it until they created it themselves with the audacious attack at Pearl Harbor. Can't exactly fault them for knowing how to go about their business. While military leaders like Yamamoto warned the Japanese leadership about the dangers of going to war, the Japanese went ahead regardless of the risks. The first part of this article is instructive in this regard:

http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/japan_1900_power.htm

And your statement about the British thinking they had enough naval units deployed to Asia to, as you say, "deter" the Japanese, only reinforces my point: the British thought they could easily hold the Japanese with what they had in place, even sending the PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE as what they thought were formidable reinforcement. But not only were they unable to "deter" the Japanese, they didn't even slow the them down. Again, Churchill is the one who talks about how shocked the British were at their defeats at the hands of the Japanese.

[–] 11 years ago

[deleted]

[–] R011DaveAAA 11 years ago

What part of IMPERIAL Japan are you having trouble with?

None of it. Their plans for expansion outside of China (if they can be so dignified) were entirely opportunistic. If there was no opportuity or urgent need, then they would not move. Opportunity, a France confused, demoralized, defeated, and under German control, was why they invaded Indochina. Need for oil, rubber, etc., to continue the war in China was the reason they moved south to overcome the embargo.

the British thinking they had enough naval units deployed to Asia to, as you say, "deter" the Japanese, only reinforces my point: the British thought they could easily hold the Japanese

I see you don't understand the differnce between deterrence and active defence. The Jpaanese also knew that if they culd sink those two ships, there was not going to be much in the way of reinforcement. As I noted, the RN had abuot eighteen battleships and battlecruisers. In real life, they didn't deploy much of that fleet until the European Axisd surface fleets were neutralized in late 1944.

The first part of this article is instructive in this regard:

The money quote:

"U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's [July 1941] embargo of oil exports to Japan pressured the Japanese navy, which had stocks for only about six months of operations.

The Japanese army, for its part, was originally concerned with fighting the fighting the Soviet Union, because of the army's preoccupation with Manchuria and China. . . . But the Soviet army's resistance to Japanese attacks was sufficient to discourage northern expansion.

Meanwhile in 1937, the intensification of Chinese resistance to the pressure of the Japanese military drew Japan into a draining war in the vast reaches of China proper, and in 1940 into operations in French Indochina, far to the south. Thus, when the navy pressed for a "southern" strategy of attacking Dutch Indonesia to get its oil and British Malaya to control its rubber, the army agreed."

[–] DD-931 11 years ago

Well, you obviously didn't read the whole article, and cherry-picked quotes, sometimes out of context, to fit your preconceptions. This statement, for instance, sounds like it was aimed specifically at people like you:

"While it seems that economic factors were important in Japanese expansion in East Asia, it would be too much to say that colonialism, trade protection, and the American embargo compelled Japan to take this course. Domestic politics, ideology and racism also played a role."

It might be helpful if you at least read the article beyond that point.

So you think that without the war in Europe Japan would never have moved beyond China (even though supplies for the Chinese resistance - from INDOCHINA - were part of the problem with their success there). Of course, by your logic, the Japanese were also never going to move against the United States until they were also embroiled in the war in Europe. Oops.

And you may think you know the difference between deterrence and active defense, but you should know that deterrence is useless unless it promotes to the enemy an ability to quickly mount an active defense. The British thought they achieved that, when they clearly did not. The IJN was built to confront the battleships of any European power as well as those of the USN, but the irony of targeting the battleships at Pearl Harbor is that the mission proved the obsolescence of battleships in modern naval warfare, a proof reinforced when the Japanese sank the PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE. Sending RN battleships up against the advanced carrier warfare of the IJN (not to mention IJN battleships like the YAMATO and it's sister, more powerful than any RN battleship) was not the cakewalk you seem to think it would be. Not to mention the great logistical problems a British fleet would have encountered so far from home. Yet another reason why the Japanese moved in such a rapid and coordinated way at places like Hong Kong and Singapore and Indonesia.

As I already stated, the Japanese were never guaranteed of success in their adventures, as flag officers like Yamamoto warned them. I would never say they were guaranteed of success against the European powers. But it was hard enough to motivate European countries like Great Britain and France to mobilize against Nazi Germany. Imagine them, absent an active war, getting their nations geared up to fight a foreign power on the other side of the planet. And the article I referenced is only one of many sources that reinforce my view that the "opportunistic" Japanese had other strong motivating factors as to why they would move regardless of a war in Europe. If it was risky for them to do so, it was no riskier than what Hitler was doing.

But believe what you want. If I haven't convinced you of why I believe what I do, you likewise haven't convinced me that your opinion is correct. So be it. The argument is on the table. Anyone can conclude what they want to conclude.

[–] R011DaveAAA 11 years ago

Well, you obviously didn't read the whole article

I did. Nothing in it notes that the Japaanese had any sort of actual plan to conquer Asia. A vague ambition to do so, yes.

So you think that without the war in Europe Japan would never have moved beyond China

Probably not, no, and almost certainly not at that time. Do note that even your own article says that the Army wanted to secure its northern flank, but went south because of the American embargo. If you think they had the ability to do invade malaya and the NEI after starting a fight with teh Red Army, then you are badly mistaken.

Sending RN battleships up against the advanced carrier warfare of the IJN

Something that did not happen to RN battleships in 1941 - as I've noted more than once.

not the cakewalk you seem to think it would be.

Strawman.

[–] Squeeth2 11 years ago

If a trade war by the USA could collapse the Japanese economy, Japan couldn't hope to have an independent foreign policy, in which the tensions within Japanese society could be exported to colonial peoples, in the manner of the Euro-Amerian empires. Japan would be fated to decline into a dependency like China or the Ottoman empire before 1914. Only Japan, Germany and the USSR had the independence after 1918 to contemplate war with the northern hemisphere hegemons as a way out. They all got it and all suffered enormously, only the USSR lasting beyond 1945. Japan went to war with the USA and the Europeans because there was a slim chance that with the European war on, Japan could steal enough to be able to escape from economic subordination. Since the war, Japan has been an American outpost like Britain but without the need to pose as chief jackal, since there's a potentially hostile continent adjacent to it.

Marlon, Claudia and Dimby the cats 1989-2005, 2007 and 2010.

[–] Matthewkay 11 years ago

This scenario was played out as a wargame at Sandhurst in the 1970s between British Army officers and their equivalent German counterparts. The result was a crushing defeat for the German Army losing nearly 80, 000 troops trapped in South East Britain. The reason was the defensive "stop lines" set up throughout Southern England. These stop lines were lines of light fortifications designed to slow the German advance until the Royal Navy had steamef down from Scapa Flow. After 2 to 3 days the German invasion fleet would have found itself waking up sharing the English Channel with the largest navy in the world. Once the Royal Navy mopped up the invasion fleet the German Army would find itself cut off with no hope of resupply from the air due to the RAF bringing in to play its squadrons from the North of England. The wargame played out at Sandhurst showed that the German Army wouldn't have even reached the outskirts of London before becoming trapped.

[–] Hotrodder 11 years ago

I've heard about that wargame and I've played wargames myself in the past but they're not necessarily conclusive though. Waterloo has been won by the French in more than a few wargames, but it doesn't mean that the gamer playing the French side is a better general than Napoleon! Wargames try to include logistics, morale and simple good or bad luck but they can't really include the big decider- sometimes against all the odds one side wins. Many battles have been decided by a smaller action within the battle or just a simple turn of fate. Sometimes a few men have changed the outcome of a battle involving thousands.

Trust me. I know what I'm doing.

[–] lancer165 10 years ago

I always thought that Wellington had suggested that it was damn close-run thing at Waterloo. I would therefore postulate this invasion game being discussed would be a rather different sort of scenario altogether. Waterloo was the culmination of a couple of days battling and manoeuvring. Also in regard to Waterloo I am of the opinion that this was not all that different to the Battle of the Bulge situation [last effort] in that Napoleon would have been caught in short time had Waterloo not worked.

My thoughts about war gaming do have to include the fact that the rules of war games surely are dependant on the chance nature of how the dice fall. Or is Sandhurst and other military schools using another format for their scenarios?

Yes chance has played well for many throughout history.

It is now a fairly well accepted thought that had Harold's men not chased the Norman cavalry etc we in the UK would have been Germanic allies anyway. Just a thought. Perhaps deluded.

[–] jd-276 11 years ago

It's doubtful that would have made any difference. A few points to consider;

Firstly, whatever happened at Dunkirk, by October, Britain had almost 3 million men under arms and they weren't all armed with pitchforks. In fact, what was left behind at Dunkirk was relatively insignificant and the factories were churning out weapons by the truckload.

Secondly, the German barges were of the river type and quite unsuitable for crossing the Channel because they had very low freeboard. One large ship passing through the flotilla would have sunk the lot.

Thirdly, there is no way the Germans could have got past the Royal Navy. It was much larger than the Kriegsmarine and the Kriegsmarine was in no shape to take on the Royal Navy after Norway.

On top of that, you cannot invade unless you have air superiority, or better yet, air supremacy. The lesson the Germans learnt during the Battle of Britain was that they would never achieve it.

An invasion also requires extensive supply lines which the Germans could not have guaranteed so they would have ended up with an isolated pocket of soldiers, trapped on foreign soil without supplies.

To sum it up, while the average Briton had every reason to be afraid in 1940, there was little chance that England could have been successfully invaded. Sure, there was always a chance that the Germans would try but that was not a guarantee of success. France and Britain were two very different propositions.

For anyone interested in the possibility, I suggest reading Derek Robinson's book "Invasion 1940".

http://books.google.com.au/books/about/Invasion_1940.html?id=MS31GAAAC AAJ&redir_esc=y

He comes to similar conclusions.

[–] tea-rex 10 years ago

One of the arguments about air superiority was that the Royal Navy wouldn't have been able to get past the German Airforce. Someone cited the Battle of Savo Island, but imagine the air opposition would have been several air wings instead of two squadrons of fighters and one squadron of fighter-bombers.

Even the British acknowledged the fact that if they'd lost air superiority, an invasion would have succeeded. Despite the Royal Navy, which would have to fight not only under constant attack from land based bombers, but also within range of land batteries.

And the German Airforce was much closer to achieving air superiority than they believed. As things were going, had they kept it up, the RAF would have been beat in a matter of weeks.
The problem was, it was too late to matter that year.

Of course, that proved Göring's notion of destroying the RAF on the ground (made impossible by Chain Home) and squatting the rest out of the sky like flies, to be wishful thinking.

All in all, the Battle of Britain wasn't won in the air, it was won in the heads of German High Command.

An invasion might have not gone as easy as predicted either, but to say it couldn't possibly have succeeded, is as much wishful thinking as Göring's.

I did not save the boy, God did. I only CARRIED him.

[–] jd-276 10 years ago

One of the arguments about air superiority was that the Royal Navy wouldn't have been able to get past the German Airforce.

It's probably not unreasonable to expect that any invasion would been carried out mostly at night. The Royal Navy would have had no difficulty operating in its home waters by night but the Luftwaffe would have had great difficulty stopping it. They had no experience of dive bombing at night so Stukas would have been ineffectual and the level bombers had little practice hitting moving targets by night.

Even the British acknowledged the fact that if they'd lost air superiority, an invasion would have succeeded.

I don't know where anyone said that. I have been reading Battle of Britain history for over 40 years and never seen that before. I do know that Sandhurst has wargamed it several times with varying results. As far as I know, none has ever taken into account the fact that the German barges were totally unsuited to a channel crossing. They also had no means of transporting trucks, much less heavy artillery and tanks.

Have a think about what was involved in D-Day and you'll have a better appreciation of what would have been needed to invade Britain, even in 1940. By rough rule of thumb, for every man at the front you need ten more to support him. Then have a think about why Dieppe failed and you can see that success depended on long and careful preparation with exact timing. Anything else is a recipe for human soup. Overlord was well-planned and Seelöwe was half-arsed in comparison.

And the German Airforce was much closer to achieving air superiority than they believed.

No way that's right. German intel on British air strength was crap. One of the salient features was just how far wide of the mark Beppo Schmid's figures were, yet they were always convinced the RAF was on its last legs. It comes up in the film when Schmid tells Jeschonnek how the RAF is down to half strength. In fact, the British always knew more about what the Germans were up to than the Germans knew about the British.

The other option was to send the fighter squadrons north which, despite what is said in the film, was a realistic option.

As things were going, had they kept it up, the RAF would have been beat in a matter of weeks.

No way. The fact is, whatever might or might not have happened, the Luftwaffe never achieved air superiority. In fact you kind of alluded to this when you referred to Chain Home. As you probably already know, you cannot mount a successful invasion without air superiority or better yet, air supremacy.

And for the record, I don't think I ever said it could not possibly have succeeded.

[–] tea-rex 10 years ago

At the end of the Battle Of Britain, the Royal Airforce's fighter strength was down to 40% of that at the beginning. One thing the Luftwaffe did achieve during that time, was to shoot down enemy aircraft faster than they could be replaced.
The Luftwaffe on the other hand, had -more- aircraft at the end than at the beginning. Aircrews were another matter, but the losses were low enough that the RAF would have run out of aircraft before the Luftwaffe ran out of pilots.
So no, the Luftwaffe never achieved air superiority, but in time they would have gotten it through attrition. That would have come at a great cost and too late to launch the invasion before the autumn storms were expected. The barges might not have been ideal, but they would have been able to carry their load 20 miles across the relatively sheltered waters of the channel in good weather. That's the critical part here. Summer was drawing to an end and autumn was coming soon.

The RAF didn't win the Battle Of Britain by sweeping the Germans out of the sky, far from it. For the actual air battle, there was no winning side.
On the strategic side however, the RAF managed to prevent the Luftwaffe to achive their objective, namely to make the sky friendly for the invasion force, -before- the autumn set in.

I did not save the boy, God did. I only CARRIED him.

[–] jd-276 10 years ago

At the end of the Battle Of Britain, the Royal Airforce's fighter strength was down to 40% of that at the beginning.

First line strength. The RAF never committed all its fighters at any one time. They rotated them throughout the battle (or campaign, depending on how you look at it). Secondly, the introduction of some of the other nationalities into the mix created a huge buffer which enabled the RAF to hold out. But none of those pilots was mentioned as part of the RAFs original OrBat. So, yes they were well down on strength and yes they were losing pilots and aircraft at an unsustainable rate. In major campaigns that's what happens but by October 1940, When the invasion was supposed to take place, the tide had turned in Britain's favour.

On top of that, I should point out that aircraft were not really the problem. The problem was always pilot availability. The new Supermarine factory at Castle Bromwich came on stream in about May (from memory) and from then on, fighter production improved until it at least equalled the loses. I should point out that this was actually a result of Chamberlain's partial restructure of the RAF in the late 1930s. Many people think that it was Beaverbrook and Churchill snapping their fingers and conjuring fighters out of thin air but it didn't happen that way. Fighters had to be developed, factories had to be built and pilots trained. This is an essential component and one which the Germans overlooked.

...the RAF would have run out of aircraft before the Luftwaffe ran out of pilots.

No, the RAF would have run out of pilots first. Aircraft availability was not a serious problem at the height of the battle. But even if the battle had played out in that Haig-esque way, the Luftwaffe would have been in no state to support an invasion.

The barges might not have been ideal, but they would have been able to carry their load 20 miles across the relatively sheltered waters of the channel in good weather. That's the critical part here. Summer was drawing to an end and autumn was coming soon.

I don't know if you have any serious boating experience (I do) but while William the Conquerer might have been able to use coracles, the practicalities of moving the Wehrmacht across the English Channel were a lot more difficult than the Germans imagined. In fact, they had no experience of it at all. They rehearsed some landings in France and lost a couple of barges in the process, without attempting to actually cross the Channel and without being under fire. Even the wash from other boats would have been a problem.

The types of barges they were planning to use were not suitable for an invasion and the chances of getting ashore were quite limited, even in good weather. Unlike the invasion barges of Overlord, none of the German types had ramps and none was designed to be beached, meaning that the troops would have to alight over the side with full packs etc. in far deeper water than would be considered safe or suitable in those circumstances. They would have lost a lot of men that way.

The only way they could have got tanks ashore would have been to unload them at dock which, for obvious reasons, would not have been possible.

The "just do it" mentality that dominated the German high command's thinking in 1940 would have cost them dearly.

The RAF didn't win the Battle Of Britain by sweeping the Germans out of the sky, far from it. For the actual air battle, there was no winning side.

While I agree with the sentiments, it sounds like a win to me. The Germans went away. Invasion plans were scrapped.

By the way, this makes interesting reading:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sea_Lion_(wargame)

[–] tea-rex 10 years ago

There was a distict advantage the RAF had:

A British pilot bailing out of a damaged aircraft was on friendly soil and back in combat in less than a day (I've read a story about a pilot who was shot down three times in one day). Less than one in six shot down aircraft resulted in lost personel. The ratio is even better if you count people returning to combat after being hospitalized.
The British side started with 1.5 pilots "per seat", but that changed during the battle to over 3. Not exactly supporting your claim that they would have run out of pilots first.

German aircrews bailing out were on enemy soil, with no hope to find support in a resistance, like the alied pilots did later in the war in France and other occupied countries.
So the crews were lost one way or the other. Due to German pilots trying to take damaged aircraft back to and over the Channel, rather than facing being interned as prisoners of war, the survival rate wasn't as good as for the British.

And thanks for misquoting me. It just shows that you really don't know what you're talking about.
I clearly stated that it was a strategic victory for the British side. But it came despite the fact that their losses were more significant than the German losses. That spells strategic victory despite tactical loss. A strategic defeat was almost certain, if Hitler wouldn't have called off the battle. But by then the invasion was out of the question.

The numbers favour the German side if it wasn't for that.

I did not save the boy, God did. I only CARRIED him.

[–] jd-276 10 years ago

The British side started with 1.5 pilots "per seat", but that changed during the battle to over 3.

I'd dearly love to know where you got this information from.

And thanks for misquoting me. It just shows that you really don't know what you're talking about.

There's no need to make it personal. I don't know what I'm talking about? That's a pretty sweeping statement. How could you possibly know what I know? I must have you worried if you're starting to think like that.

You come back when you're feeling a bit more reasonable and we'll talk then. Otherwise I'm not interested in engaging with you.

[–] tea-rex 10 years ago

At the beginning of the Battle of Britain, fighter squadrons were organized with 18 pilots for 12 operational aircraft (4 sections of 3 aircraft in V or "vic" formation).
That was first re-organized into 3 sections of 4 aircraft (mimmicking the German "Schwarm" formations), then squadrons were merged for a nominal strength of 24 pilots for 16 operational aircraft.
At the end of the battle, fighter squadrons averaged 6 operational aircraft, but had still 20 pilots available to fly them.
That's 1.5 and 3.33 pilots per operational aircraft, respectively.

A pretty good site is http://battleofbritain1940.net/, but I also did some research in the library years ago when I was playing the game.

PS: your posts are a pretty good indicator of what you don't know.

I did not save the boy, God did. I only CARRIED him.

[–] jd-276 10 years ago

When you learn some politeness we'll talk.

Otherwise I'm not interested in engaging with you.

[–] tea-rex 10 years ago

I'm not really interested in talking with trolls.

I did not save the boy, God did. I only CARRIED him.

[–] Hotrodder 10 years ago

Tea rex is taling through his hat for the most part here. No way the RAF was at half strength or so at the end of the battle just for starters. It was actually larger than at the beginning.
The attacks on the aerodromes simply weren't working. Fighters usually took off from grass fields and as fast as the Germans made craters the RAF just filled them in again. Even the loss of even hangars wasn't that serious- aircraft was maintained in open air instead. No RAF airfield save Manston was closed for more than hours. And Manston was closed temporily as it was the closest to France.
The pilot shortage was a problem but one the RAF overcame. It wasn't shortage of men so much as the length of time it took to train them. Training was shortened and replacements outnumbered losses.
Dowding realised earlier that the RAF's survival was the key thing, not shooting down large numbers of German aircraft. His control of his resources was masterful.
With the most advanced fighter control system in the world operating, good aircraft in the Spitfire and Hurricane and brave men to fly them the Luftwaffe simply wasn't good enough to win.
As for denying the RN access to the Channel it has to remembered that the Germans didn't possess an armour piercing bombing so it's attacks on RN ships wouldn't be very effective anyway.
I largely agree with jd276 here for the most part. However one thing he did get wrong- the Germans modified some barges, adding ramps to take tanks. I doubt it made them any more seaworthy though!
A good recent book on the Battle Of Britain is The Most Dangerous Enemy by Stephen Bungay. He concludes that the Luftwaffe never really had a hope of winning the battle- the RAF was simply too well prepared. For once someone had prepared for the next war and not the last one.

Trust me. I know what I'm doing.

[–] DD-931 10 years ago

I very much agree with jd-276's points. In fact some of them concerning the RN and the German barges sound like they came from me .

And as measured and intelligent as his posts clearly are, calling him a troll makes for a sadly desperate last ditch response. Agreeing to disagree might have been more mature.

[–] Squeeth2 10 years ago

THE SILENT VICTORY - September 1940 by Duncan Grinnell-Milne 1958

Marlon, Claudia and Dimby the cats 1989-2005, 2007 and 2010.

[–] The_Khazi 10 years ago

I don`t think it would have been sustainable although quite possible that the Germans could have forced a passage through the channel and landed maybe a few thousand men.Barges were totally inadequate and they had no landing craft so maybe an initial paratroop assault but then how to resupply?Again they could have landed Paratroops in Southern Ireland but where to go from there?The German Navy was modern but incredibly weak and even with the help of the powerful(on paper)Italian Navy the Royal Navy was more than a match.It`s possible they could have simultaneously landed paratroops in Scotland via Norway ,in conjuction with an attack on the South, but without any hope of quick reinforcent or resupply this would have ultimately lead to disaster.The only way to defeat Britain was to take her overseas colonies and then squeeze.The Germans could have easily taken Gibraltar, with a few more bribes to Franco, and with the Italians could have rolled up the Med;Malta would have been isolated and ultimately doomed;Rommel would have his supplies and taken Suez, leading to the Middle East and the oilfields.With the loss of Egypt,Malta, and ultimately control of the Med, even Churchill would have had severe difficulty galvanising resistance at home.
The Luftwaffe wasn`t trained or equipped for a protracted air assault on Britain although Goring made critical mistakes-such as attacking London rather than Fighter Command itself-but even so a frontal assault on Britain in 1940 would have failed.

[–] Squeeth2 10 years ago

None of those alternatives would have changed the fundamental shortage of commodities under the British blockade. The only place that could possibly alleviate the shortages of rubber, copper, oil, iron ore and grain which were connecrted to central Europe by land, were Ukraine and Caucasus. The Germans invaded Russia in 1941 for reasons of weakness.

Marlon, Claudia and Dimby the cats 1989-2005, 2007 and 2010.

[–] DaveR011 9 years ago

Not too bad, but some points:

The Germans could have easily taken Gibraltar, with a few more bribes to Franco,

Franco wasn't having any part of it for any price the Germans could pay. Spain was dependent on maritime imports for food, for one thing, and knew Germany could not make up the difference. That's why he made deliberately unacceptable proposals to Hitler.

with the Italians could have rolled up the Med;

Given that almost all British supplies to the Mid East went around Africa to Suez, losing Gibraltar would not have been decisive nor would this improve the situation in the central and eastern Med.

Rommel would have his supplies and taken Suez,

Taking Malta would certainly help, but the main logistic issue was not getting supplies to Africa, but getting them from the ports to the front. The transport infrastructure both at the ports and forward was not good enough. This is why every German offensive petered out after they got about three hundred miles from their depots in Libya (and vice versa for the British. Given that the Axis could not advance beyond Alamein so long as the British decided to hold it, any talk of advance to Iraq etc becomes moot.

[–] jd-276 10 years ago

However one thing he did get wrong- the Germans modified some barges, adding ramps to take tanks.

Yep. Chalk that up. I'd forgotten about those and I should have known because they are pictured in Derek Robinson's book. One thing though; it would have been very difficult to land them even if they did make it across the Channel. The Germans did some work to make them waterproof but none of this was any kind of guarantee of success.

I read Bungay's book with some interest. It's as good a modern interpretation as they come but I think it suffers from one weakness. Bungay seems to like a bet each way.

Thanks to you and DD-931 for your kind remarks.

[–] BuddyLove63 10 years ago

I clearly stated that it was a strategic victory for the British side. But it came despite the fact that their losses were more significant than the German losses.

How do you work that out when the Luftwaffe lost more planes and 4 times as many air crew and how do you work that out when by mid September 1940 the RAF had more pilots than the Luftwaffe????????????

[–] DaveR011 9 years ago

http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/document-42.html
http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.ca/2012/02/battle-of-britain-1940-strength-reports.html
http://ww2db.com/doc.php?q=309

It rather looks as if the RAF was able to maintain fighter numbers during the Battle going from about 500 serviceable Spitfires and Hurricanes at the beginning of July to 600 at the beginning of Spetember.

[–] 10 years ago

[deleted]

[–] andy-1394 10 years ago

a quick check of the numbers on wikipedia would tend to agree with what tea-rex said. without the deadline in the form of autumn weather approaching, the luftwaffe would have grinded down the airforce eventually the same way the red army grinded down the wehrmacht later on the eastern front: greater numbers giving them the option to sustain greater losses and still be on the winning side. fortunately (or unfortunately for the germans) it would have come too late to take advantage of it. when that became apparent, hitler called it off.

I remember words that fell
like coins into a wishing well

[–] BuddyLove63 10 years ago

a quick check of the numbers on wikipedia would tend to agree with what tea-rex said. without the deadline in the form of autumn weather approaching, the luftwaffe would have grinded down the airforce eventually the same way the red army grinded down the wehrmacht later on the eastern front:

Nope. I have just been to Wikipedia. Wikipedia says this:

""In July – September the number of Luftwaffe fighter pilots available fell by 136, but the number of operational pilots had shrunk by 171 by September. The training organisation of the Luftwaffe was failing to replace losses.... The number of pilots in RAF Fighter Command increased during July, August and September. The figures indicate the number of pilots available never decreased. From July, 1,200 were available. In 1 August, 1,400 were available. Just over that number were in the field by September. In October the figure was nearly 1,600. By 1 November 1,800 were available. Throughout the battle, the RAF had more fighter pilots available than the Luftwaffe the number of RAF fighter pilots grew by one-third between June and August 1940. Personnel records show a constant supply of around 1,400 pilots in the crucial weeks of the battle. In the second half of September it reached 1,500. The shortfall of pilots was never above 10 percent. The Germans never had more than between 1,100 and 1,200 fighter pilots, a deficiency of up to one-third.If Fighter Command were 'the few', the German fighter pilots were fewer........ On 7 September RAF aircraft losses fell below British production and remained so until the end of the war. From July to September, the Luftwaffe's loss records indicate the loss of 1,636 aircraft, 1,184 to enemy action. This represented 47 per cent of the initial strength of single-engined fighters, 66 per cent of twin-engined fighters, and 45 per cent of bombers. This indicates the Germans were running out of aircrews as well as aircraft"

Are you seriously suggesting the Luftwaffe failed due to the autumn weather? LOL, September 1940 was famously a glorious Indian summer with fine clear flying weather. The Luftwaffe failed because the RAF was it's match and were stronger in fighter pilot numbers.