MovieChat Forums > Oppenheimer (2023) Discussion > using the gadget against Nazi Germany

using the gadget against Nazi Germany

posted a year ago by 22radians (22)
3 replies | jump to latest

After seeing Oppenheimer, one thing I'm curious about is why the gadget wasn't ready for use--or at least wasn't used--against Nazi Germany, but was only used against Japan to force their surrender in August 1945.

For much of the Manhattan Project, the movie shows it as essentially a scientific research project with a dedication to research but without clear deadlines to produce a clear result.

However, shortly after the suicide of Hitler and the surrender of Nazi Germany, there is a definite shift in gears, and everyone is now ready to commit to a time to use the gadget (or, in some cases, to a petition to prevent its use). There is some haggling between Groves and Oppie: Groves wants two working gadgets by July; Oppie prefers to wait until September; and eventually they settle on a test in July followed by two working gadgets in August if the test succeeds. The tone though is definitely that it is time to commit to dates, and this is a significant change in focus.

To me it is at the very least an odd coincidence that this change occurs right after Hitler's suicide. Yes, it is certainly possible that this is how things played out, and purely by coincidence the research was significantly advanced by just after Hitler's suicide to make a commitment to producing viable gadgets.

But it does seem remarkably coincidental. It almost looks to me like there was a military reason for not wanting to use the gadget against Hitler (despite multiple characters claiming otherwise), but once Hitler was out of the way (and only once he was out of the way) it was time to move the plans for using the gadget against Japan out of the lab and into the actual war.

Any thoughts on this timing? Was it truly a coincidence, or did they indeed (as it certainly looks to me) hold off on using it against Hitler for some reason?

If they did prefer not to use the gadget against Hitler, I'm guessing that the situation with Stalin had a lot to do with it. Using a weapon of that power unexpectedly might have threatened delicate and complex negotiations and agreements with Stalin hammered out in Tehran and Yalta. By contrast, the conversation in Potsdam--with Hitler already defeated and dead but Stalin not yet in the war against Japan--would have been a much simpler (relatively) discussion.

Another factor is that FDR died at very close to the same time, so perhaps Truman's policies on the use of the gadget differed from FDR's.

[–] liscarkat (19418) a year ago

You said it in your first line--it wasn't ready. Besides, Germany had been sinking fast for months and their demise was imminent. Japan carried on the war for a few months after Germany surrendered, and according to the best intelligence, had no plans to give up. By then the bombs were ready. Using them ended the war with Japan, and saved a lot of lives, including Japanese lives.

[–] SolarisPatchwork (298) a year ago

You left out the part where we wanted to send a message to the Soviet Union, were afraid that the Soviets would invade Japan and at most we'd obtain only half (similar to Germany), and many powerful people were gearing up to go to war with the Soviets immediately after the Pacific theater ended.

[–] 22radians (22) a year ago

This is essentially my point. The decision to use the gadget against Japan is often framed--including by most people in this film--as being one of saving both American and Japanese lives by averting the need for a full scale invasion.

I agree with this understanding as far as it goes, but what often seems overlooked (including in this film) is what role Stalin might have played in a full scale invasion of Japan. It seems to me there would have been great political pressure in the US to allow Stalin as big a role as he was willing to take, as allowing Stalin a significant role would have reduced what were expected to be very heavy American casualties. Of course, this would have come at the price, as you've said, of Stalin having significant influence in post-war Japan. It appears to me that Stalin was indeed gearing up to have the USSR play a major role in the invasion.

So it is true that using Fat Man and Little Boy greatly reduced both American and Japanese casualties, but what is often left unsaid is that the use of these weapons also greatly reduced Soviet influence in post-war Japan, and I'm sure that was part of the calculation too. (No doubt Soviet casualties were also reduced, but that wouldn't have been Truman's motivation.)

So there was a clear strategic reason to use nuclear weapons against Japan in August 1945. I'm not, however, seeing the same strategic advantage in nuking Hitler in early 1945 even had the weapons been ready by then. To cite just one reason, Auschwitz had been liberated by Jan 1945, so few lives would have been saved in the Holocaust by nuking Hitler in the early months of 1945. The strategic situation in Japan was very different.