Episode 6
Not unlike his movie JFK Stone can’t help but put the notion on the table that Kennedy was going to withdraw from Vietnam and the MIC killed him for it. One of his big pieces of evidence is NSAM 263 (a favorite of the conspiracy crowd). But NSAM 263’s withdraw of 1,000 troops was contingent on the South Vietnamese being able to “pick up the slack” and provide for their own defense. (The memo references an October 2, 1963 statement by the White House that says exactly that.) The language of the memo does not support the idea of a complete withdraw saying such things as: “We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and Government of South Viet Nam to deny this country to Communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible..... Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Viet Nam are capable of suppressing it.”
The real purpose of NSAM 263 was to express our displeasure with the Diem’s regimes repressive actions:
By Stanley Karnow:
“Early in 1963, South Vietnam's rigid President Ngo Dinh Diem was cracking down on internal dissidents, throwing the country into chaos. Fearing that the turmoil would benefit the Communist insurgents, Kennedy conceived of bringing home one thousand of the sixteen thousand American military advisers as a way of prodding Diem into behaving more leniently. Kennedy's decision was codified in National Security Action Memorandum, or NSAM 263. Its aim was to "indicate our displeasure" with Diem and "create significant uncertainty" in him "as to the future intentions of the United States." Kennedy hoped the scheme, which also scheduled a reduction of the U.S. forces over the next two years, would give the South Vietnamese the chance to strengthen themselves.”
(In Mark C. Carnes, ed. Past Imperfect, p. 272)
At another point (as evidence for the withdraw theory) Stone brings up the opinions of several people who claim JFK told them he intended a complete withdraw after his reelection. But what Stone fails to tell his audience here is the fact that many of them (i.e. Ken O’Donnell, Dave Powers, etc.) made this claim after the Tet Offensive. (In a remarkable case of recovered memory.) Even Noam Chomsky didn’t buy that one (calling them “Camelot memoirists” that were trying to separate JFK from the growing mess that Vietnam became; read: ‘Rethinking Camelot’).
Indeed one of the best ways to demonstrate this is the fact Stone drags RFK into it. Quoting an interview that RFK did with Daniel Ellsberg in 1967 (the same year he began to advocate a withdraw) RFK says JFK would have pulled out…..but what was he saying just a few years before? In 1965, Robert Kennedy rejected the idea of withdraw from Indochina without victory as a “repudiation of a commitment undertaken and confirmed by three administrations.” He warned that the abandonment of South Vietnam by the U.S. would “gravely-perhaps irreparably-weaken the Democratic position in Asia.”
And what did he say in 1964? Here is an interview he did:
Martin: All right. At the beginning we seemed to have our lines crossed. I mean, the majority leader in the Senate, Mansfield, was saying this was not an American war, and he didn't think it was--that our--it should be--not, not--should not be an American war. He didn't think our heavy commitment there was justified. How'd you feel about it; how'd the president feel about it; and at what point did we get our lines straightened out?
Kennedy[RFK]: Well, I don't think that . . .
Martin: Did I make myself clear?
Kennedy: No, I don't think that fact, Senator Mansfield or somebody in the Senate takes a position, necessarily means .. .
Martin: Well, he was majority leader.
Kennedy: Yeah, but, you know, he's frequently taken that, those, that line or that position on some of these matters. I don't think that the fact he has an independent view from the executive branch of the government, particularly in Southeast Asia, indicates that the lines aren't straight. I, no, I just, I think every. . . . I, the president felt that the. . . . He had a strong, overwhelming reason for being in Vietnam and that we should win the war in Vietnam.
Martin: What was the overwhelming reason?
Kennedy: Just the loss of all of Southeast Asia if you lost Vietnam. I think everybody was quite clear that the rest of Southeast Asia would fall.
Martin: What if it did?
Kennedy: Just have profound effects as far as our position throughout the world, and our position in a rather vital part of the world. Also, it would affect what happened in India, of course, which in turn has an effect on the Middle East. Just, it would have, everybody felt, a very adverse effect. It would have an effect on Indonesia, hundred million population. All of these countries would be affected by the fall of Vietnam to the Communists, particularly as we had made such a fuss in the United States both under President Eisenhower and President Kennedy about the preservation of the integrity of Vietnam.
Martin: There was never any consideration given to pulling out?
Kennedy: No.
Martin: But the same time, no disposition to go in all . . .
Kennedy: No . . .
Martin: . . . in an all out way as we went into Korea. We were trying to avoid a Korea, is that correct?
Kennedy: Yes, because I, everybody including General MacArthur felt that land conflict between our troops, white troops and Asian, would only lead to, end in disaster. So it was. . . . We went in as advisers, but to try to get the Vietnamese to fight themselves, because we couldn't win the war for them. They had to win the war for themselves.
Martin: It's generally true all over the world, whether it's in a shooting war or a different kind of a war. But the president was convinced that we had to keep, had to stay in there . . .
Kennedy: Yes.
Martin: . . . and couldn't lose it.
Kennedy: Yes.
Martin: And if Vietnamese were about to lose it, would he propose to go in on land if he had to?
Kennedy: Well, we'd face that when we came to it.
Third Oral History Interview with
ROBERT F. KENNEDY
April 30, 1964
New York, New York
By John Bartlow Martin
For the John F. Kennedy Library
In other words, what they would have done would depend on the situation…..which is exactly what happened to President Johnson because contrary to popular belief, he didn’t just rush right in with combat troops……in fact it wasn’t until March 1965 until that happened.
But probably the most mind boggling part of this episode is when he said that JFK’s death meant the passing of the torch from the new/young generation to the old…..referring here to LBJ, Nixon, and Reagan. Say what?! They were all of the same generation! True they were all a bit older…..LBJ was 9 years older than JFK, Nixon 4 years older, and Reagan 6. (That puts them on average at just 6.3 years older than JFK.) But all served in the armed forces during WW II and (consequently) are considered part of the WW II/Greatest Generation. How Stone can consider these 3 part of another generation is some strange math.
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