MG42


awesome ambush weapon

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It is by far the best machine gun ever made. However, it is not an ambush weapon. It's role is to suppress movement of troops and of course inflict casualties. But, it is not an ambush weapon.

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Yeah, but you should always initiate an ambush with your most casualty producing weapon. In most cases for the Germans that would be the MG42.

If a day does not require an AK,
it is good
Ice Cube
Warrior Poet

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Actually, awesome/penultimate weapon for defending against mass human wave attacks. I always wondered why the US Army didn't collect disgarded ones in WW2 (hell, even the MG34 at 15 rounds/sec), rechamber them for the .30-06 and use them in Korea against those Chicom wave assaults. From what I've read the MG42 would operate in mud, snow, cold, you name it.

I'm guessing the US Army brass was still in that same mindset the Infantry Branch had in WW2, resulting in the wrong weapons in the wrong place at the wrong time.

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I always wondered why the US Army didn't collect disgarded ones in WW2 (hell, even the MG34 at 15 rounds/sec), rechamber them for the .30-06 and use them in Korea against those Chicom wave assaults.

Because that is an awful lot of work when you have warehouses full of Brownings.

If a day does not require an AK,
it is good
Ice Cube
Warrior Poet

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From the standpoint of supply and bureaucrats, that would be true. I mentioned Chicom human wave assaults so I thought it was clear I was talking about what was the best tactical idea, not what made life easier for supply or Infantry branch career bureaucrats. Brownings were WW1 weapons and clearly intended for walking fire use.

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The problem with Browning being such a prolific designer is that a lot of different weapons out there get called Brownings, from pistols to shotguns to .50 inch HMG's. In this case, you seem to be referring to the M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle. That's sort of an MG-42 equivalent when the German weapon was used in the squad support role. Whether a proper LMG like the Bren, MG-42 in the light role, or Minimi is better for that purpose than a beefed up automatic rifle is a question that is still debated.

In the medium role, the Browning equivalents to the MG-42 are the water-cooled M1917 and the air cooled M1919A4. The biggest advantage the MG-42 and FN MAG have over the M1919 is the much quicker and easier barrel change.

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Yes, I was referring to the B.A.R. The human wave assault would have to be dealt with by using volume of fire because indirect fire weapons (mortar & artillery) cannot be brought to bear quick enough. So a direct fire weapon would have to be used and that would then require volume of fire. Cleraly, the B.A.R. could not put out enough due to magazine change requirements.

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That's not the role of the squad automatic rifle or LMG. That's the role of platoon and company MMG's and in a defensive position like those common in Korea, properly sighted in mortars can r4eact in under a minute. Do note that platoons in Korea usually had more than one M1919 as platoon weapons with more at company level.

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In a human wave attack, like the ones the Chicoms did in Korea, squad and platoon roles would not matter much. Properly sighted mortars would only get in one shot, if that, and then have to re-aim to a news position. Volume of fire, therefore, via direct fire weapons, would become imperative. Changing magazines every 20 rounds and not barrel changes would not be conducive to high volume of fire.

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The general outcome of the so-called human wave attacks when opposed by adequately motivated troops was a lot of dead Chinese. Chinese successes happened when troops were unmotivated or when they had enough numerical superiority that they could not be stopped. I=Once the situation became static, such tactics became totally ineffective.

As for mortars, a platoon of 81 mm or 3 inch mortars would have no problem dropping twenty or thirty rounds in a minute's firing.

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Adequate motivation would not result in a lot of dead Chinese. A lot of firepower (with the motivation to use it, of course) is what would result in a lot of dead Chinese. A human wave attack would have to be stopped, thoroughly stopped, so that none of the combatants in the wave attack could penetrate ones lines, which would be disastrous.


I=Once the situation became static, such tactics became totally ineffective.

I am not sure what that exactly means.



As for mortars, a platoon of 81 mm or 3 inch mortars would have no problem dropping twenty or thirty rounds in a minute's firing.
I'm sure they would. But those, like artillery barrages, require a stationary (or nearly so) target. A human wave attack would be soldiers moving forward. And everyone knows that infantry are taught (should be) to keep moving when the indirect fire comes down. Worse thing to do would be to stop and freeze.

A human wave attack would have passed through the impact zone of where the mortar/artillery fire was aimed. The indirect fire would have to be reaimed again and again. I can't see any solution to a human wave attack other than direct fire, and a lot of it.

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Adequate motivation would not result in a lot of dead Chinese.

It certainly does if they do not run away, as ROKA and US Army troops did with monotonous regularity in 1950/51. OTOH, troops willing to fight, like the Marines at Chosen Reservoir and the 27th Commonwealth Brigade at Kapyong or even or the 1st Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment before being overrun, tended to get impressive kill counts.
I am not sure what that exactly means.

It means when both sides dug in along what became the DMZ in 1951, hunman wave attacks would be against well fortified, dug in troops. This means so-called human wave attacks were even less effective than similar attacks along the Western Front in 1914-18.
But those, like artillery barrages, require a stationary (or nearly so) target
.
Given the response time, soldiers on foot may as well be standing still. Bunched up soldiers in waves don't move that fast in a minute. They aren't doing quarter mile runs in a minute at night while under fire. Nor are they just popping up out odf nowhere a few feet from UN lines.
A human wave attack would have passed through the impact zone of where the mortar/artillery fire was aimed.

Assuming the company and platoon officers calling in and correcting fire were idiots, sure. Generally, they weren't.

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It certainly does if they do not run away
Then I think it would become even more an imperative to have high volume of fire. Even if none had run away, high volume of fire would be needed against human wave attacks.



It means when both sides dug in along what became the DMZ in 1951
Agreed. The "real" fighting was in the first year of the war. The next two years (mid 1951 to mid 1953) was the two sides trying to work out a solution to what to do with captured Chicom and N.K. troops. While that was going on the two armies tried to capture a little more ground here and there before the armistice was signed.



in 1951, hunman wave attacks would be against well fortified, dug in troops
I agree that being dug in to the nth degree would be very nice against human wave attacks. But those soldiers attacking you in a wave still need to be .... uh ... shot, so again a high volume of fire.

One thing I had not said before was that once the wave assault is "broken", if you will, or heavily depleted in numbers, then the high volume of fire would not be necessary. From that point on, aimed fire (to pick off survivors) would be the thing to do. Especially since you would try to keep, for as long as possible, your opponent from determining the exact position of these high volume of fire weapons not to mention indirect fire support weapons.


Given the response time, soldiers on foot may as well be standing still. Bunched up soldiers in waves don't move that fast in a minute.

My thought before was that by staying on the move, they were not completely out of danger but 20/30 yards away greatly removes one from the blast radius (or whatever it's called).

My understanding of Korea was that it was mountainous (not too high) terrain with endless ravines across ranges.



They aren't doing quarter mile runs in a minute at night while under fire. Nor are they just popping up out odf nowhere a few feet from UN lines.
Well .... I didn't think I was getting across quite that idea.




Assuming the company and platoon officers calling in and correcting fire were idiots, sure. Generally, they weren't.
Still, indirect fire would have to be constantly reaimed because the attackers have moved out of the immediate blast area. One thing I just thought was that a defender would try to induce the attackers to concentrate on a few places, kinda channel the attackers where possible, so as to make worthwhile pre-zeroing in the mortar/artillery. Hope that made sense.

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As they got a good enough volume pof fire from existing weapons, you're chasing a solution in search of a problem.

You also do not understand how artillery and mortars work. By 1950, they had decades of experience targetting moving bodies of troops. Like any shooting, they knew how to lead their targets. Rounds do not land where the troops were when first called for fire, but where it was predicted they'd be when the rounds hit the ground. Given the lethal radius of an 81 mm round against troops in the open is something like 100 meters, there's a lot of room for error.

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As they got a good enough volume pof fire from existing weapons, you're chasing a solution in search of a problem.
That's your opinion, not a fact and I don't share it.



You also do not understand how artillery and mortars work.
That's your opinion, not a fact and I don't share it. You claiming it, don't make it so. I've demonstrated plenty understanding.




By 1950, they had decades of experience targetting moving bodies of troops. Like any shooting, they knew how to lead their targets. Rounds do not land where the troops were when first called for fire, but where it was predicted they'd be when the rounds hit the ground.
I've never heard that one. Doesn't sound like anything the infantry went through in Korea, or WW2 for that matter.



Given the lethal radius of an 81 mm round against troops in the open is something like 100 meters,
That might be the range at which a mortar shell fragment can still be lethal if, and emphasis of IF, it were to errantly hit someone. Not in the least was that what I was talking about. There is lethal radius and then there is effective radius.

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That's your opinion, not a fact

It's a fact that unless massively out numbered, troops willing to stand and fight fairly easily drove off so-called human-wave attacks. Even when they did not, they would inflict disproportionate casualties on the attacking forces - something like ten-to-one in some cases.

It's noteworthy that even after Korea, the next generation of small arms for the Western armies involved did not include MG-42 like weapons at the section level. The UK adopted an LMG (the FN MAG) with the same ROF as the Bren while Canada, Australia, and, initially, the US adopted weapons similar to the BAR, if newer and lighter (C2 and L2 versions of the FAL and the M15 version of the M14).
I've never heard that one.

You mean after three long wars dealing with advancing bodies of troops, Allied artillery and mortars couldn't predict movement and adjust fire? Korean War era artillery was well able to stop troops in open, even to the point of being able to fire danger-close to dug-in friendly forces. There are plenty of instances where artillery was called right on top of UN forces.

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It's a fact that unless massively out numbered, troops willing to stand and fight fairly easily drove off so-called human-wave attacks. Even when they did not, they would inflict disproportionate casualties on the attacking forces - something like ten-to-one in some cases.
Nah. Still need a direct fire weapon of high volume. Just like in the ACW, the shoulder-to-shoulder infantry formations had to be met with high volume of fire, including cannon firing grapeshot. Large caliber mortars in those days were relegated to use in positional warfare. Key point, though, is high volume of fire.

Same in WW1. Artillery had advanced and had some telephone spotters. But machine guns were (high volume of fire, in those days) still needed. That is what WW1 was remembered for; the machine gun fire. Yes, there were hellacious artillery barrages, but those came before the infantry advanced.

No different in Korea.


It's noteworthy that even after Korea, the next generation of small arms for the Western armies involved did not include MG-42 like weapons at the section level. The UK adopted an LMG (the FN MAG) with the same ROF as the Bren while Canada, Australia, and, initially, the US adopted weapons similar to the BAR, if newer and lighter (C2 and L2 versions of the FAL and the M15 version of the M14).
Yeah, after the days of wars of large conventional forces seemed to be over.



You mean after three long wars dealing with advancing bodies of troops, Allied artillery and mortars couldn't predict movement and adjust fire? Korean War era artillery was well able to stop troops in open, even to the point of being able to fire danger-close to dug-in friendly forces. There are plenty of instances where artillery was called right on top of UN forces.

That's not what I've read about. Many American POWs returned after the war said they had been captured because the Chicoms/NKs were all over/around them. I've heard many vets over the years describe the wave assaults they were subjected to and the dismay at the weapons they had to face them.

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Same in WW1. Artillery had advanced and had some telephone spotters. But machine guns were (high volume of fire, in those days) still needed.

I'm certainly not claiming that small arms fire was ineffective, but that doesn't mean it's a replacement for artillery. Even, perhaps especially, in the First World War, artillery was the major killer. Something like three quarters of all casualties were caused by artillery with about and eighth caused by MG fire. By the end of the war, gunners had gotten very good and sophisticated indeed. Once radio was added to the mixture in the Second World War, it became especially deadly.
Yeah, after the days of wars of large conventional forces seemed to be over.
AT this time, NATO and allied forces weer preparing for major, conventional war in Europe and expected that Red China would remain an existential threat. Small arms development reflected that and the lessons learned from the Second World War and Korea.
Many American POWs returned after the war said they had been captured because the Chicoms/NKs were all over/around them.

Most of them were captured when the units and formations they were in lost cohesion. Often they were grossly outnumbered. When they stood fast, the casualty ratios were very much in the UN forces favour.

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I'm certainly not claiming that small arms fire was ineffective,
That's a straw man argument. I've never said anything like that about you.

Artillery worked in some situations in the American Civil War. Such as the siege around Richmond between Grant and Lee, among other instances. It didn't work against infantry on the move, but when they were stationary.

In WW1 artillery was effective for the pre assault barrage, not when the infantry were moving forward. The barrages of WW1 were said to be truly monumental but that was when the opposing force was stationary. I've always read it was the machine gun that did the most killing.

WW2 had time on target barrages but again when the target was stationary. Again, the machine gun (MG42, MG34) were the main casualty creators.

The lessons of WW2 and Korea were that mass charges were best dealt with direct fire weapon, and a high volume of fire.

Yes, the moment Korean soldiers were captured were when in retreat. But the retreat was induced by large scale communist assaults. I would however believe that in the first half year there weren't many fixed positions that so necessary to meet large infantry attacks. The second and third year of that Korean conflict, when both sides had pretty much settled down to positional warfare, involved more fixed positions.

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In fact, that's quite wrong. The use of artillery in the advance* was critical for the success of Allied offensives from 1916 on. They had developed things like silent registration, box barrages, and creeping barrages. Nor were machine guns the major casualty producers in either war.

* that is, after infantry had gone over the top and as they were moving across No-Mans-Land and into German lines.

The retreat was caused not by any deficiency in UN weapons, but by Skillful use of basic light infantry tactics like infiltration, the ability to concentrate forces at key points, the sheer numbers of Chinese troops, and the shaky morale of US Army and ROKA troops. Where UN forces stood fast and kept artillery support, they almost always held. Replacing the two BARS per squad with a single LMG would not have helped. Indeed, the power of American artillery was such that the Vietnamese soon abandoned the tactics taught them by Chinese advisors in favour of ones that neutralized American's ability to effectively use artillery and air support.

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No, it wasn't quite wrong. It is correct. Artillery had to be used mainly before the attack, otherwise they wouldn't have used those tremendous barrages pre-battle. They would have used them more during the attack, which they didn't. And it was machine guns that caused most of the carnage in WW1.

Yes, the number of Chinese troops and lack of Allied infantry weapons to counter them was the main aspect of ground combat in Korea, especially that first year. Allied air power is what kept the rout from being worse.

Artillery in Vietnam was even less effective against VC/NVA when they were on the move.

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And with that first two sentences, you show you have absolutely no credibility on this subject - something confirmed by the rest of your post.

Have a nice day.

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Nice attempt at surrender covered up to look like saving face.

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Sorry, if I meant BAR I would have said BAR. I meant the 1919, although the 1917 was still around in some arms rooms and would have been ideal for the static phase.

If a day does not require an AK,
it is good
Ice Cube
Warrior Poet

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The high rate of fire is not quite as useful for infantry work as it appears. One still has to limit to number of rounds going downrange to avoid overheating, and one can still only carry so much ammo. The post war versions of the MG-42, the MG-3, had the rate of fire reduced.

It's telling that postwar machine guns, like the FN-MAG (L7 GPMG in the UK and M240 in the US) or the PK have similar rates of fire to the Browning and are much more popular worldwide than the MG-3.

They did try to make a .30-06 MG-42, though. That attempt did not work. After the war, many were converted or newly built to accept the 7.62 mm NATO round. That version is still in use by several armies, including Germany's.

The Browning may not have been as good an LMG as the MG-42, but it was still quite effective as a tripos mounted weapon. American industry was geared up to make tens of thousands of Brownings and there was little interest in disrupting production to bet a slightly better MMG into the field to replace one that was good enough.

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In the end, most air-cooled machine guns can sustain an average of about 100 rounds per minute, or so I read years ago. Perhaps modern materials have altered that.

The water-cooled machine guns, although having a slower cyclic rate, could put out far more rounds in the long term. One of the tests of the Browning M1917 involved continuous firing of 40,000 rounds without interruption. In one famous mission in the First World War, several British machine guns were used of for continuous indirect fire for several hours, with the gunners hands cramping from holing down the triggers for so long. Supposedly, that fire prevented a German counter-attack that day. A major problem in such missions is to clear away the hills of spent brass.

A friend of mine in the National Guard tried continuous fire with an M-60 in the 1980s. The gun stopped at about 2200 rounds, in a ruined condition. My friend said the last few hundred rounds were "coming out sideways". Fore safety, they used a wire to hold the trigger back. Nobody manned the gun.

By the way, the largest caliber of any Browning designs I know of was a series of automatic 37mm guns. Recall the P-39 and P-63. He died in 1926, yet many of his designs are still in production. One of his pistols was used in the assassination that started the First World War. The most produced machine gun of the Second World War was not the inexpensive MG42, but the very expensive Browning M2 .50, with around 2 million produced. The B-24 production line alone used around 180,000 of them. Today, almost every pump-action or semi-auto shotgun uses Browning mechanisms, as do many lever guns, like the 1894 Winchester. FN built many Browning designs, as did Colt and Winchester, including the BAR, and today's FN MAG uses a mechanism derived from that of the BAR.

 Entropy ain't what it used to be.

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The attempt to produce a 30-06 MG-42 was intentionally foiled by not changing enough dimensions in the design , aside from the chamber, to accommodate the longer 30-06 round. The 8X57 Mauser has a 57mm case length while the 30-06 has a 63mm case length. Intentional because the MG-42 wasn't invented here and might replace the M1919. It was more of a bureaucratic thing than anything.

What they did do was introduce the M1919a6 which used a bipod, shoulder stock with a pistol grip making it a more effective LMG better adapted for portability.

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The attempt to produce a 30-06 MG-42 was intentionally foiled

Do you have a reliable source for that? It isn't as if an Americanized MG-42 was the only project that didn't work out. US made Hispano HS404 20 mm guns, for instance, proved almost unusable due to redesign for American production.

As for the M1919A6, it was better than, say, the Great War LMG conversion of the Maxim gun, but was still too heavy and lacked a quick change barrel.

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One thing that usually accompanies human wave attacks is shortage of ammo among other things like being surrounded cutoff and SOL. Lower cyclic rates help conserve ammunition. The M1919 was far from useless in places like Chosin and Punchbowl. The M1919 definitely was one of the first CHICOM population control methods. Imagine how many more 10s of thousands of descendants would be walking around China today without the M1919.

You are taking a dump and they call GQ do you pinch it off or finish your business?

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I believe tplast is writing about replacing the BAR with a full sized LMG, like the MG-42 in the light role rather than the M1919 in the sustained fire role.

I'm far from convinced that replacing the one or two BARs in a squad with one MG-42 would have made a significant difference in Korea and, given what initially replaced the BAR (and the Bren in Australia and Canada) I don't think the post-Korea US Army and Marines did either.

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The Germans never seemed to run low on ammo for their high rate of fire machine guns. Americans and British never really reported (at least not often) that they captured Germans because the Germans ran out of ammo but because they pushed the Germans back and back into defensive strongholds that would then be pummeled with artillery/air.

That's what I've read.


Imagine how many more 10s of thousands of descendants would be walking around China today without the M1919.
And if the Americans had a higher rate of fire, belt (or quick change drum) fed, barrel changing MG there would be even less Chinese. I would think.

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The Germans never seemed to run low on ammo for their high rate of fire machine guns.

Nor could they or did they carry more ammo than M1919 equipped troops. As Vulcan pointed out, the actual rate of fire for all air-cooled machine guns ends up being about a hundred RPM regardless of the cyclic rate.

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Nor could they or did they carry more ammo than M1919 equipped troops.
Nor did I ever say that they could, or said anything implying that. I've read the German squad members would carry the extra ammo for the squad MG.



As Vulcan pointed out, the actual rate of fire for all air-cooled machine guns ends up being about a hundred RPM regardless of the cyclic rate.
B.A.R. was box fed and had no barrel quick change. German MG had quick barrel change plus fed by belt/quick drum change.

Allied infantry couldn't obtain fire power superiority with Garands, BARs and .30cal LMGs against the Germans, so they had to use their artillery more.

From what I've read the B.A.R. was designed with WW1 in mind.

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Nor did I ever say that they could, or said anything implying that.

If they only have x number of rounds, they can only send x number of rounds down range no matter what the rate of fire.
I've read the German squad members would carry the extra ammo for the squad MG.

Who do you think carried the MG and BAR ammo in an American leg platoon - or anyone else's infantry? Part of every non-mech infantryman's load is a share of the amo for the squad/platoon/company support weapons.

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If they only have x number of rounds, they can only send x number of rounds down range no matter what the rate of fire.
Nor did I ever say that they couldn't, or said anything implying that.


Who do you think carried the MG and BAR ammo in an American leg platoon - or anyone else's infantry? Part of every non-mech infantryman's load is a share of the amo for the squad/platoon/company support weapons.
And again, nor did I ever say that they couldn't, or said anything implying that.

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Ahh, weapons of obscene and wanton human destruction...lovely....

"Do you want to give him a kiss?"

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