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Who was right about taking Culp's Hill, Trimble or Ewell?

posted 8 years ago by star_in_the_zenith_79
9 replies | jump to latest

I'm not sure how historically accurate the conversations are between Trimble and Lee, but obviously it seems that Trimble felt Ewell's corps should have taken Culp's Hill, and take it easily.

Of course we know Ewell hesitated and did not. So who was right? Did Ewell know something Trimble did not? And could they have taken it?

We know eventually the Union twelfth under Slocum fortified Culp's Hill very effectively. But when did they get there? Could Ewell really have taken it or did he know Slocum was already in place?

Was Trimble right about Culp's Hill being easily taken, or was he just being a proverbial Monday morning QB?

[–] mlbroberts 8 years ago

I think historians agree it was Cemetery Hill, not Culps Hill, that Lee was talking about when he told Ewell to take it :if practicable." I don't think it was practicable.

First, Ewell's men had fought all the way through town and could not have taken the hill without support, which AP Hill said he could not give him because his own men were played out. There were no fresh troops available for Ewell to use, even in support.

Second, the Union forces were digging in on Cemetery Hill even before the advance Union troops fell back to it. The hill was not empty as Trimble thought.

Third, even Culp's Hill would have been beyond Ewell's capability to take. Union forces were arriving in droves and Ewell would have had to deal with the forces on East Cemetery Hill too.

Never underestimate the value of the high ground and interior lines. The Union had both, almost from the moment Buford first arrived.

[–] star_in_the_zenith_79 8 years ago

Yeah. You're right about Cemetery Hill. I'm not sure Culp's Hill was even visible from Lee's position, so it would make sense he would target the one he could see. I do know also Howard left one of his divisions on Cemetery Hill in reserve to hold it as a rallying point. Obviously the whole fight west of town was to delay the Confederate advance so that Cemetery Ridge could be fortified.

Cemetery Hill was bald, so preparations to defend it would have been clearly visible. It would have been more difficult to ascertain whether or not Culp's Hill was because it is pretty heavily wooded from what I understand. But I think if Ewell had drove straight for it, he might have been able to take it. It shows that he was indecisive about which hill he should drive for, and wound up taking neither. I guess you can't be to hard on Ewell though, he had no way of foreseeing how critical those two hills would become.

[–] indy_go_blue44 8 years ago

I think another point is that Ewell had served as a division commander under Jackson for the past year; Jackson was known for giving commands that were explicit about what he wanted done and how to do it. Up to Gettysburg, Lee was known for giving suggestions and discretionary orders. Ewell had been a corps commander for only a month, and I think Lee's discretionary order "take the hill, if practicable" totally confused him. I have little doubt that Jackson would have thrown a force together and at least tried to take the hill, but neither Ewell nor anyone else in the Confederate army was a Jackson.

The other factors have been discussed. The Second Corp was fought out north of Gettysburg, it was totally disorganized by fighting through the town, and the hill was already manned and being fortified.

Cemetery Hill is pretty big; it stands about 60-80 feet above the town. It's extremely doubtful Lee could have seen Culp's Hill from the Chambersburg Pike a mile or more west of town. However from most sources I've read, Culp's Hill was empty at the time the "take that hill" order was given. It's possible that Ewell could have taken it, but with enough strength to hold it and the means to reinforce it are questionable.*

(*I just read that "a couple of Union brigades were sent over to Culp's Hill later (no time given) in the afternoon." Was this before or after Lee's order was received? I don't know.)

[–] star_in_the_zenith_79 8 years ago

Yep. I think the lack of cavalry scouting came into play there. Lee did not have very good knowledge of the terrain south of town. If he had, he probably would not have been so aggressive, he may have even tried to fortify Herr Ridge or McPherson's Ridge and tried to goad Meade into attacking when he showed up. Those were fairly defensible. Instead he was determined to attack the Union Army before they could concentrate, but Buford and Reynolds delayed them to long, they payed a hefty price and lost the day and got beaten up badly, but won the battle in the end.

Lee was undoubtedly talking about Cemetery Hill. I don't think Culp's Hill was visible from Lee's position at the time and he may not have even been aware of it until later. Ewell knew about it, but recognized its importance to late.

From everything I can gather, I think had Ewell concentrated both of the divisions he had on the field on Culp's Hill, he could have taken it, not only would this have made Cemetery Hill indefensible, but it would have also cut off the Union twelfth corps off from the first and eleventh, allowing Hill to finish them off. But Lee I think was unaware that Culp's Hill was there, and Ewell recognized its importance to late.

Almost everything that could go wrong did go wrong for the South in this battle when you think about it. They won some victories the first two days and beat up three Union corps, but still the situation worked against them and put them in a bad position the third day, and they payed a heavy price for what they did accomplish as well.

[–] indy_go_blue44 8 years ago

I love the title Shelby Foote uses for his chapter (and later released as a separate book) on the Gettysburg Campaign, "The Stars in Their Courses", which I believe was a quote from Shakespeare's Henry V. Lee seemed to be as obsessed with the "decisive battle" as were the Japanese 80 years later at Midway. It's also believed that he wasn't on top of his game because he was suffering from severe diarrhea (green apples, too many cherries and berries?) and possibly from cardiac pain.

IMO, the entire AoNV leadership was severely lacking at Gettysburg. Hill was sick, Longstreet was (seemingly) out of sorts with Lee, and Ewell was way over his head as a corps commander.

[–] mlbroberts 8 years ago

"From everything I can gather, I think had Ewell concentrated both of the divisions he had on the field on Culp's Hill, he could have taken it, not only would this have made Cemetery Hill indefensible, but it would have also cut off the Union twelfth corps off from the first and eleventh, allowing Hill to finish them off. But Lee I think was unaware that Culp's Hill was there, and Ewell recognized its importance to late. "

I talked to one of the rangers at Gettysburg a couple weeks ago. According to him, Ewell did have someone take a look at Culp's Hill and it was pretty empty of Union troops at the time, but Union troops were coming. Ewell could not have taken it - it was just too late.

IMO, Ewell did the best he could do with both Culp's and Cemetery Hill. He gets a bum rap, but that's part of the mindset that "the ANV lost Gettysburg," not "the AOP won Gettysburg." I've volunteered at Gettysburg for many years, and the longer I look at things and talk to a lot of people with opinions, the more I believe the AOP won it. The notion that better management by Lee and his corps commanders could have won the battle for the ANV just doesn't hold water.

[–] indy_go_blue44 8 years ago

After the war Gen. Pickett was often asked (and often blamed) about why the South lost at Gettysburg. His answer: "I think the Army of the Potomac had something to do with it."

To paraphrase Longstreet, "no 80,000 men were going to take those hills" with the entire AoP in position on the high ground. Had the Europeans not dismissed the ACW as "gangs of rabble not worth studying" they might have learned something about headlong attacks against fortified positions and saved a few million casualties.

[–] tallkennj 8 years ago

Ewell's corps had been in a harder fight that day than people want to give them credit for. Yes, it's possible he could have scrounged up a couple of regiments who hadn't been so heavily engaged and maintained some semblance of order. And it's even possible they could have made it up the hill. I just don't think they could have stayed up there. They would necessarily have been a small force who'd already marched all day and then would have had to fight an uphill battle against whatever remained of Howard's corps including artillery. Then, they would have had to face down the rest of the Union army which was coming up the road from Maryland and right toward the back side of that hill the same time Ewell's attack was fighting up the front side . Mind you, I think it was a risk worth taking and there is little doubt Jackson would have found a way to do it. I just don't think it would have changed anything beyond adding to the casualties.

[–] kincaid-5 8 years ago

And don't forget that Ewell didn't have a full corps. On paper, he had three divisions. Johnson's took a different route to rejoin the AoNV and didn't arrive on the battlefield until the first day's fighting was over. Rodes's was badly cut up in poorly coordinated attacks against the Federal First Corps around midday. That left only Early's, which had just fought the Federal Eleventh Corps and done the street fighting in Gettysburg itself. There really were no reserves to support an assault on Cemetery Hill, which was heavily occupied by that point.

Ad to that the fact that the hill couldn't be attacked from the north -- troops could not deploy in the built-up area of the town itself -- so Early would have to have moved his division out of town to form up for an attack, which would have taken time.

Culp's Hill -- there's no reason to think Lee ever considered that -- was out of the question. The northern face is very high, steep, and wooded. It was where they parked what was left of the First Corps, and there was no real fighting throughout the battle. The hill could only be attacked from the southeast, which would have involved Early's one, tired division breaking all contact with the rest of the AoNV and making a long march around the Federal flank -- having no idea where they were going or how many forces the Federals had there.

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