Suppose the Germans had succeeded in getting to Antwerp and getting a solid foothold there. Would this have meant a German victory, at least on the Western Front, or would it have just been delaying the inevitable?
Delaying the inevitable. By December of 1944, the Germans were unable to reverse Allied air superiority even with jet fighters. They didn't have the resources to build any more than they had by the end of the war. Worst case scenario for the Allies would have been deploying the Lockheed P-80 and the Gloster Meteor before their quirks and bugs had been worked out and still maintaining air superiority. The Germans might have taken Antwerp but they couldn't hold it against a counterattack from both sides of the salient. The M-26 Pershing heavy tank, which was deployed only weeks after the Battle of the Bulge, might have seen more action against the already diminishing German Panzer forces.
Then after all that, still in the worst case scenario for the Allies, the US would have gone nuclear on Germany before doing so on Japan. End of story.
I'm an avid WW2 historian, and I agree with that assessment. One thing that really bothers me about the film, and the mythology of the Battle of the Bulge in general, is the idea that the outcome of the war depended on the success of the Ardennes Offensive. Its just not true.
Aside from what you point out, I'd add that the Soviet steamroller had finished its southern swing through Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and was ready to strike west towards the Oder River by December, 1944. That was to be the fate of Nazi Germany. I believe the Germans were allocating roughly 80% of their military resources to the East, post 1943, and they were losing badly.
In the very unlikely event that the Germans achieved their goals in the Ardennes, they would have had an impossible task of defending the salient. The Allies had massive numbers of ground assault planes, the weather wasn't going to be overcast forever.
Hitler's Ardennes Offensive was pure folly. I'd argue that it shortened the war. Had Hitler used his considerable armored resources to fight skillful tactical retreats with rearguard actions on BOTH fronts, he might have extended the war and made the Allies to pay a very heavy price. But, Hitler was a mad man, not a military commander.
Also the steam roller that was the Red Army would have still fought it's way into Berlin. Remember anything that happened on the Western front was just a side show compared to the "total war" fought on the Eastern front.
I can also shed some light on your question. Military history books state that Hitler's generals were quietly aware that such an ambitious objective of splitting the Americans and the British at Antwerp and causing the British to drop out of the war was an impossible, unrealistic goal. The Americans, British, and Canadians were simply just too strong. The German generals presumed that a more realistic goal of crossing the Meuse River and causing enough havoc and disruption to the Allies which would give Germany more time to fight on was more realistic.
The American Army was at the top of its game by late 1944. It was no longer the inexperienced army of the Kasserine Pass in 1942. Its logistics capability and resources were almost limitless. The British Army was also at the top of its game and better than ever. The British Army's weakness was not really a weakness but an Achilles Heel. The British had nearly reached the end of its manpower resources and Hitler knew this. Delve deeper into military history and historians say that the British had no more reserves to throw into the European theater. Only the Americans could continue throwing in fresh divisions, although those divisions would be as green as grass with 18 and 19 year olds.
With General Patton of the Third Army racing to the rescue, there was only so much damage the Germans could do.
What it not discussed more is Hitler's thinking. History criticizes Hitler for throwing away his manpower and material reserves in the Ardennes offensive. But if you realize that Hitler was thinking bigger, the survival of Germany, not simply to delay the inevitable defeat, then his reasoning makes more sense. Not going on the counteroffensive would have only delayed the ensuing Battle for Germany that much longer and bloodier. The Russian Red Army could have possibly overwhelmed 2/3rds or 3/4ths of Germany while the American, Brits, Canadians, and French were held up in the Northwest (British/Canadians), west (Americans), and southwest (French) of Germany. Saving Germany's manpower reserves would have indeed held up the western Allies in the western parts of Germany, leading to a bloody near-stalemate, while the Russians rolled over eastern Germany, into central Germany then meeting up with the western Allies. The end of the war in Europe would have seen the Red Army in control of anywhere from 60 to 75% of Germany, and very reluctant to relinquish any of that conquerored territory to the western allies.
I think "reluctant" is a gross understatement or estimate. Stalin was eager to go to war with Germany, but on his own schedule. By December 1944 they had recovered.
Had the Battle of the Bulge slowed us down by months the Russians (Stalinists at that time, remember) would have seized more German territory. Had we been delayed sufficiently, were would have dropped A-bombs on Germany.
We may have developed a much more contentious German occupation relationship with the Soviet Union. Instead of a Cold War, that relationship may well have led to World War III before Stalin had the good grace to drop dead.
The best diplomat I know is a fully charged phaser bank.
I agree, if they could have made Antwerp it would have been a great set back. But the Germans could never have held the flanks of that salient. Once the weather cleared in the spring it would have had no airpower to protect it and the effort to keep it would have further have weakened their front in the east.