Okay, it's true that to be a "Compatibilist," you must believe in Determinism in some form. But Compatibilism itself seems to be a choice -- true by definition.
That is, if you define free will to be something we have, then obviously we have it. We don't have to believe in it.
If we imagine that there's only one way tomorrow can look (since there's nothing outside the present that can alter the present) then it's just a question of what "free will" would be.¨
If "free will" is "I can choose coffee or tea now." then we'd have it since the present involves choosing one.
If "free will" is "I can choose coffee or tea now so there are two possible futures." then we wouldn't have it since there's only one present and only one future (if things are as we imagined).
"Need" is just a fiction. As is "should", "must", "value" and "importance".
I'm a bit confused by your post.
First, you seem to be using "belief" in the colloquial way where it's contrasted with "knowledge." Is that right?
In philosophy, knowledge is standardly considered to be a type of belief (namely justified, true belief).
Compatibilists are going to believe that they have choices, of course, but you can't make something like free will obtain simply because you define it that way.
I don't think calling compatibilism a belief works that well. I'm more in favor of understanding it as a policy choice, a kind of stance one takes. It isn't a matter of being right or wrong about some objective fact about the universe, it is a policy of how to treat such facts.
shareThank you, Faustus. That's what I was trying to say.
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